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 1 
THE FLIP SIDE OF MICHIGAN V. EPA: ARE CUMULATIVE IMPACTS 
CENTRALLY RELEVANT? 
 
Sanne H. Knudsen* 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
In the world of environmental regulation, cost and public health protection are 
often cast as mortal enemies, mutually dissatisfied lovers, or at least incompatible 
roommates. Indeed, environmental regulation often serves as the poster child for 
government overreach and costly regulatory burdens that are allegedly inferior to 
free market mechanisms.1 This rhetoric of regulatory cost fuels passion for a 
deregulatory agenda.2 At the same time, environmental regulation is widely 
acknowledged to be a necessary response to the public health externalities created 
                                               
* © 2018 Sanne H. Knudsen. Thank you to the Wallace Stegner Center for selecting me 
to participate in the Utah Young Scholars Program and providing me the opportunity to give 
a public talk upon which this article is based.  
1 For a detailed scholarly account of the revival of a laissez faire approach to 
environmental harm, see THOMAS O. MCGARITY, FREEDOM TO HARM: THE LASTING 
LEGACY OF THE LAISSEZ FAIRE REVIVAL (2013). 
2 For a detailed scholarly account of the role that environment has played in 
perpetuating the belief that regulations adversely impact the economy, see DOES 
REGULATION KILL JOBS? 1–30 (Cary Coglianese et al., eds., 2013) and Alana Semuels, Do 
Regulations Really Kill Jobs, THE ATLANTIC (Jan. 19, 2017), https://www.theatlantic.com 
/business/archive/2017/01/regulations-jobs/513563/ [https://perma.cc/2UGC-B496]. For an 
example of an article that pits environmental regulation against the growth of the U.S. 
economy without quantifying any benefits, see Dale W. Jorgenson & Peter J. Wilcoxen, 
Environmental Regulation and U.S. Economic Growth, 21 RAND J. ECON. 314, 314–15 
(1990). For an example of general concerns about regulatory overreach and the use of 
environmental regulations to fuel that concern, see Ben Goad & Julian Hattem, Regulation 
Nation: Obama Oversees the Expansion of the Regulatory State, THE HILL (Aug. 19, 2013), 
http://thehill.com/regulation/administration/317485-regulation-nation-obama-expands-the-
regulatory-state [https://perma.cc/G8BB-DVLT] (“Nowhere is [the use of expansionist 
power to enact major policy shifts] more evident that at the Environmental Protection 
Agency . . . .”).  
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by an industrialized economy.3 There is no shortage of individuals criticizing 
government agencies for not protecting public health aggressively enough.4  
Legal scholars have long debated the appropriate role of cost in driving 
environmental regulatory decisions.5 Much of this debate has centered on cost 
benefit analysis. Some scholars urge that cost benefit analysis is a rational 
framework for identifying “smarter lifesaving regulation.”6 Still, others have derided 
the reduction of human obligations to the natural world to a game of numbers rather 
than a discussion of morality.7 To be sure, even those that advocate for cost benefit 
                                               
3 In Pew Center Survey conducted in 2016, “about three-quarters of U.S. adults (74%) 
said ‘the country should do whatever it takes to protect the environment,’ compared with 
23% who said ‘the country has gone too far in its efforts to protect the environment.’” Monica 
Anderson, For Earth Day, Here’s How Americans View Environmental Issues, PEW 
RESEARCH CENTER (Apr. 20, 2017), http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2017/04/ 
20/for-earth-day-heres-how-americans-view-environmental-issues/ [https://perma.cc/R5CR 
-X7NE]. Interestingly, on the particular issue of whether regulations are necessary to 
encourage the use of renewable energy, Americans are more divided. See Cary Funk & Brian 
Kennedy, Public Divides Over Environmental Regulation and Energy Policy, PEW 
RESEARCH CENTER (May 16, 2017), http://www.pewinternet.org/2017/05/16/public-
divides-over-environmental-regulation-and-energy-policy/ [https://perma.cc/58F7-VHQN] 
(reporting that 54% of Americans view regulations are necessary to further energy policy); 
see also Victor B. Flatt, Opinion, Environmental Law Protects Us All, THE CHARLOTTE 
OBSERVER (Jan. 27, 2017), http://www.charlotteobserver.com/opinion/op-ed/article12915 
4869.html [https://perma.cc/7X57-YZL8]. 
4 See, e.g., Thomas O. McGarity & Rena I. Steinzor, The End Game of Deregulation: 
Myopic Risk Management and the Next Catastrophe, 23 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL’Y F. 93 
(2012). 
5 Compare Cass R. Sunstein, Cost-Benefit Default Principles, 99 MICH. L. REV. 1651, 
1652 (2001) [hereinafter Sunstein, Cost-Benefit Default Principles] (urging that ambiguities 
or silences in statutory frameworks should be read as allowing agencies to consider cost), 
with FRANK ACKERMAN & LISA HEINZERLING, PRICELESS: ON KNOWING THE PRICE OF 
EVERYTHING AND THE VALUE OF NOTHING (2005) (criticizing the influence of cost benefit 
analysis in social regulation on the grounds that it is politically corrupted, theoretically 
flawed, and morally misplaced).  
6 See, e.g., John D. Graham, Saving Lives Through Administrative Law and Economics, 
157 U. PA. L. REV. 395, 399–400 (2008) (asserting that the aim of cost-benefit analysis is 
not deregulation but really “more protection against risk at less overall cost to the private and 
public sectors.”). 
7 See, e.g., Amy Sinden, A ‘Cost-Benefit State’? Reports of Its Birth Have Been Greatly 
Exaggerated, 49 ENVTL L. REP. 10933, 10956 (2016) (summarizing the criticisms of cost 
benefit analysis “that have been catalogued in a vast and long-standing literature”); Frank 
Ackerman et al., Applying Cost-Benefit to Past Decisions: Was Environmental Protection 
Ever a Good Idea?, 57 ADMIN. L. REV. 155, 157 (2005) (“The cost-benefit calculation’s 
attempt to assign monetary values distorts, misrepresents, and narrows the priceless values 
of life, health, and nature, and belittles the widespread concern for the well-being of future 
generations.”); Lisa Heinzerling, Regulatory Costs of Mythic Proportions, 107 YALE L.J. 
1981, 1983 (1998) (explaining why value judgments are inherent in cost benefit analysis 
when, for example, deciding whether and how to discount the value of a human life); MARK 
SAGOFF, THE ECONOMY OF THE EARTH: PHILOSOPHY, LAW, AND THE ENVIRONMENT (2d ed. 
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analysis as a foundation for regulatory decisionmaking acknowledge that the public 
health focused environmentalism of the 1970s “appears, by most accounts, to 
survive cost-benefit balancing, producing aggregate benefits in the trillions of 
dollars, well in excess of the aggregate costs.”8 Similarly, many champions of 
environmental protection recognize the virtue of cost consideration in at least some 
aspects of the development and implementation of environmental laws.9  
It is against this backdrop that the Supreme Court decided Michigan v. EPA,10 
tapping into the familiar refrain that deciding the extent to which people should 
tolerate living in a polluted environment is as much about cost as it is about public 
health. In Michigan v. EPA, the Court reviewed the EPA’s decision to regulate 
mercury emissions from power plants.11 Importantly, the Clean Air Act gave the 
EPA authority to regulate power plant emissions that it deemed “appropriate and 
necessary.”12 In deciding whether regulating mercury emissions was indeed 
appropriate and necessary, the EPA focused on issues of public health. The EPA 
took the position that it need not consider costs at the threshold level of whether to 
regulate.13 Rather, costs would be and in fact were taken into account when setting 
the emissions standards. The Supreme Court reviewed the EPA’s decision and held 
that the EPA should have considered cost when deciding whether to regulate because 
                                               
2008) (explaining that economics is misguided in applying cost-benefit analysis to 
environmental problems); Martha C. Nussbaum, The Costs of Tragedy: Some Moral Limits 
of Cost-Benefit Analysis, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 1005, 1005 (Jun. 2000), 
http://philosophy.uchicago.edu/faculty/files/nussbaum/The%20Costs%20of%20Tragedy.pd
f [https://perma.cc/A7MX-SBP3] (arguing that cost benefit analysis cannot help answer the 
“tragic question,” which is focused on avoiding moral wrongdoing); see also RENA I. 
STEINZOR, MOTHER EARTH AND UNCLE SAM: HOW POLLUTION AND HOLLOW GOVERNMENT 
HURT OUR KIDS 19–21 (2008) (arguing that an overemphasis on cost benefit analysis is 
responsible in part for a world where government has failed to protect children from toxic 
chemicals). 
8 Sunstein, supra note 5, at 1657; see also Green tape: Environmental regulations may 
not cost as much as governments and businesses fear, THE ECONOMIST (Dec. 30, 2014), 
https://www.economist.com/news/finance-and-economics/21637411-environmental 
-regulations-may-not-cost-much-governments-and-businesses [https://perma.cc/ET3W-
RQ63] (“[T]he new study confirms earlier findings about the impact of individual measures: 
‘an increase in stringency of environmental policies does not harm productivity growth.’”). 
9 See, e.g., Michael A. Livermore & Richard L. Revesz, Rethinking Health-Based 
Environmental Standards, 89 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1184, 1187–88 (2014) (asserting the logical 
need for cost as a method of identifying a limit to welfare-maximizing limit to regulation 
while also arguing that cost-benefit analysis can lead to more stringent regulation in some 
instances); cf. David M. Driesen, The Ends and Means of Pollution Control: Toward a 
Positive Theory of Environmental Law, 2017 UTAH L. REV. 57, 77–79 (2017) (describing 
technology based standards and their incorporation of cost as an analytical feature of 
environmental law but suggesting that cost benefit analysis lacks normative underpinnings 
in environmental law).  
10 135 S. Ct. 2699 (2015). 
11 Id. at 2704. 
12 42 U.S.C. § 7412(n)(1)(A) (1999). 
13 Michigan v. EPA, 135 S. Ct. at 2705. 
4 UTAH LAW REVIEW [NO. 1 
cost is a “centrally relevant factor” to regulatory decisionmaking.14 Failure to 
consider cost, then, rendered the EPA’s decision arbitrary and capricious.  
Read broadly, the decision creates a presumption that “reasonable regulation” 
in general necessitates some attention to cost.15 To some, the breadth of Michigan 
has been a cause for celebration among those who are eager to proclaim a cost 
benefit state.16 To others, the Court’s emphasis on cost appears to be an 
antienvironmental decision with adverse implications beyond the context of the case 
itself. At least one early commenter predicted that the decision “ha[s] the potential 
to impede agencies pursuing aggressive public-health and environmental 
agendas.”17  
But the breadth of its language and the driving pragmatism that underlies its 
reasoning suggests an application of Michigan beyond cost. Taken to its logical 
conclusion, Michigan raises a more fundamental proposition worth exploring—
whether there are factors besides cost that are so centrally relevant to environmental 
decisionmaking that failure to consider those factors renders the decision invalid. 
Cost, in other words, assumes a role in environmental decisionmaking for the 
pragmatic reason that the appetite for regulation is not endless. But cost does not 
drive the enterprise itself. Environmental law is a social endeavor, not an economic 
one. It stands to reason that there is a more fundamental purpose to environmental 
law that transcends the important, but surely secondary, goal of cost effectiveness.  
This Article explores the flipside of Michigan—where the Court’s logic can 
just as well support agencies in their public health and environmental protection 
efforts. In particular, taking Michigan as a blueprint, this Article argues that 
cumulative impacts are centrally relevant to environmental regulation and—like 
cost—deserve a systemic and meaningful role in agency decisionmaking, including 
in the threshold decision of when to regulate. In doing so, this Article serves as a 
counterbalance to the weight of cost benefit rhetoric that would reduce 
environmental law off to a line item in a strained budget.  
“Cumulative impacts” can generally be thought of as the collective 
consequences of human activity over space and time. The implementing regulations 
for the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (“NEPA”)18 define cumulative 
impacts as “the impact on the environment which results from the incremental 
                                               
14 Id. at 2707. 
15 See Cass R. Sunstein, Cost-Benefit Analysis and Arbitrariness Review, 41 HARV. 
ENVTL. L. REV. 1, 15 (2017) [hereinafter Sunstein, Cost-Benefit Analysis]; John D. Graham 
& Paul R. Noe, A Paradigm Shift in the Cost-Benefit State, THE REG. REV. (Apr. 26, 2016), 
https://www.theregreview.org/2016/04/26/graham-noe-shift-in-the-cost-benefit-state/ 
[https://perma.cc/YXS3-HY43]. 
16 See Sunstein, Cost-Benefit Analysis, supra note 15, at 16; Graham & Noe, supra note 
15.  
17 Clean Air Act–Cost-Benefit Analysis–Michigan v. EPA, 129 HARV. L. REV. 311, 311 
(2015) [hereinafter Clean Air Act–Cost-Benefit Analysis]; see also David M. Driesen, Is 
Cost-Benefit Analysis Neutral?, 77 U. COLO. L. REV. 335, 335 (2006) (“[T]his Article shows 
that CBA has almost always proven anti-environmental in practice.”).  
18 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321–4370 (2017). 
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impact of the action when added to other past, present, and reasonably foreseeable 
future actions.”19 The regulations aptly recognize that “[c]umulative impacts can 
result from individually minor but collectively significant actions taking place over 
a period of time.”20 Taking this broad definition as a guide, the concept of cumulative 
impacts as discussed in this Article incorporates concepts of aggregate harm and 
intergenerational equities. Moreover, these impacts can be additive or synergistic.  
Many environmental statutes already contain provisions that embrace a 
cumulative impacts perspective. But because regulating through a cumulative 
impacts lens is more complicated than dividing regulatory decisions into discrete 
and disconnected choices, the most compelling parts of environmental laws—those 
that tackle issues of collective action directly—have been relegated to the sidelines 
instead of playing a central role in setting regulatory priorities or identifying areas 
of public health concerns. In an effort to refocus efforts in environmental regulation 
on real world public health and ecological problems, this Article offers a simple but 
important thesis: cumulative impacts are so centrally relevant to environmental and 
natural resources law that failure to account for those impacts when making 
regulatory decisions is arbitrary and capricious. In the area of water quality 
regulation, for example, a cumulative impacts analysis might require regulators to 
consider existing nonpoint and point sources of pollution before issuing or reissuing 
additional discharge permits in a given region. In the area of toxics regulation, a 
cumulative impacts lens would encourage regulators to consider risks from multiple 
chemicals with similar toxicity pathways (e.g. assess impacts of endocrine 
disruptors as a group as opposed to a series of individual chemicals). In the area of 
public lands management, a more aggressive cumulative impacts lens to 
decisionmaking might encourage regulators to better plan for the impacts of climate 
change on federal lands. For example, BLM land managers might consider impacts 
of federal lands grazing on climate change.21  
In support of that thesis, this Article proceeds in three parts. Part I examines the 
Court’s reasoning in Michigan with the goal of creating a blueprint for deciding 
when a factor is “centrally relevant” to regulatory decisionmaking. Part II then 
shows why cumulative impacts so permeate the set of concerns embodied by 
environmental law that they qualify as centrally relevant factors that ought to drive 
                                               
19 40 C.F.R. § 1508.7 (2014). 
20 Id. 
21 Jessica Wentz, Planning for the Effects of Climate Change on Natural Resources, 47 
ENVTL. L. REP. 10,220, 10,222 (2017) (“[C]hanges in hydrologic conditions will affect the 
capacity of a rangeland to accommodate livestock grazing, and the risk of more intense 
droughts will affect the determination of what constitutes a ‘prudent and responsible’ water 
conservation measure.”); see also Juan Carlos Rodriguez, Enviros Say BLM Ignores 
Grazing’s Effect on Climate Change, LAW360 (Apr. 11, 2016), https://www.law360.com/ 
articles/782876/enviros-say-blm-ignores-grazing-s-effect-on-climate-change [https://perma 
.cc/BR6S-BQ5D]; Mikaela S. Ellenwood et al., Managing United States Public Lands in 
Response to Climate Change: A View from the Ground Up, 49 ENVTL. MGMT. 954, passim 
(2012); M. Gill et al., Mitigating Climate Change: The Role of Domestic Livestock, 4 
ANIMAL 323, passim (2010). 
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regulatory choices. Finally, Part III provides some examples of how focusing on 
cumulative impacts through the judicial review framework could reinforce the 
public health missions of environmental laws.22 Indeed, in the struggle to understand 
the impacts of a climate changed world on the availability, vulnerability, and 
distribution of resources, this lens of cumulative impacts will be even more critical 
to the mission of sustaining healthful communities.  
 
PART I:  EXAMINING THE LOGIC AND BREADTH OF MICHIGAN V. EPA 
 
In Michigan v. EPA, the Court concluded that cost is a centrally relevant factor 
to regulatory decisionmaking and must therefore be considered unless Congress has 
directed otherwise. This Part explores whether Michigan’s procost presumption is 
derived from precise statutory language and the technical turn of deference 
doctrines, or whether the Court’s conclusions flow more freely from broader 
principles of reasonableness and relevance. In particular, this Part starts by laying 
out the regulatory background and describing the Court’s reasoning. This Part then 
goes on to examine how the case has departed from previous jurisprudence and 
norms regarding agency deference. Finally, this Part concludes by suggesting a 
blueprint for its application to other foundational aspects of environmental law. In 
doing so, this Part lays the foundation for considering whether cumulative impacts 
could be rightfully identified as centrally relevant to environmental decisionmaking 
as a complement to cost.  
 
A.  The Regulatory History and Reasoning of Michigan v. EPA 
 
The Clean Air Act directs the EPA to regulate hazardous air pollutants from 
power plants when doing so is “appropriate and necessary.”23 In 2012, the EPA 
adopted a final rule setting mercury and other emission standards for power plants.24 
The EPA explained that it had made the appropriate and necessary finding based on 
public health considerations of mercury exposure.25 In particular, the EPA found that 
it was appropriate to regulate because mercury is a hazard to public health, and U.S. 
power plants are the largest domestic source of mercury emissions.26 The EPA also 
found it appropriate to regulate because it had identified pollution control options 
                                               
22 This Article sets aside the question of whether Michigan has actually elevated the 
importance of cost in judicial review. Also, the purpose of this Article is not to examine 
whether the Court’s conclusion as to cost is correct or incorrect with respect to the Clean Air 
Act. Rather, this Article focuses on the broad principle introduced by the Court that there 
may be factors so fundamental to regulatory decisionmaking that failure to consider those 
factors renders the decision invalid. 
23 42 U.S.C. § 7412(n)(1)(A) (1999).  
24 The Mercury Air Toxics Standards Rule, 77 Fed. Reg. 9304, 9367 (Feb. 16, 2012), 
invalidated by Michigan v. EPA, 135 S. Ct. 2699, 2707 (2015).  
25 Id. at 9362–63. 
26 Id. 
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that would effectively reduce mercury emissions from power plants.27 The EPA 
found that it was necessary to regulate under Section 112 because other provisions 
in the Clean Air Act were not adequately addressing the serious public health and 
environmental hazards from power plant emissions.28 The EPA determined that 
appropriate and necessary did not require the agency to consider costs.29 Those 
considerations would come later in the process when setting the limits of mercury 
emissions.  
Various industry groups and states challenged the Rule based on the EPA’s 
decision not to consider costs in the threshold issue of whether to regulate. The D.C. 
Circuit denied the petitions for review and upheld the Rule in its entirety.30 In 
particular, Judge Rogers writing for the majority concluded that Section 112 “neither 
requires EPA to consider costs nor prohibits EPA from doing so.”31 The court further 
held the EPA’s construction of the ambiguous term was reasonable given that: (1) 
Section 112(n)(1)(A) specifically directs the EPA to make a finding based on the 
study regarding public health hazards from power plant emissions; (2) Congress has 
required the EPA to regulate other sources of pollution without considering cost; (3) 
Congress forbids the EPA from considering cost when deciding whether to delist 
source categories from hazardous air pollutants (“HAPs”) regulation; and (4) for 
other sources Congress requires the EPA to account for cost only when setting the 
proper level of regulation.32 Judge Kavanaugh dissented in part, arguing that the 
term “appropriate” is “the classic broad and all-encompassing term that naturally 
and traditionally includes consideration of all the relevant factors, health and safety 
benefits on the one hand and costs on the other.”33 In fact, considering costs and 
benefits, Judge Kavanaugh argued, is “just common sense and sound government 
practice.”34 The Supreme Court granted certiorari and reversed, using broad based 
language and following the logic in Judge Kavanaugh’s dissent.35 
The disagreement between the parties can be traced to the Clean Air Act’s 
differential treatment of sources of HAPs. By way of background, when Congress 
adopted amendments to the Clean Air Act in 1990, it radically changed its approach 
to regulating hazardous HAPs such as mercury, arsenic, cadmium, hydrochloric 
acid, and hydrogen cyanide. Unlike previous versions of the Act, which had largely 
                                               
27 Id. at 9366.  
28 Id. at 9363.  
29 Id. at 9326–27 (explaining that it is “reasonable” to regulate mercury emissions from 
power plants without considering cost). In fact, the EPA made clear that its Regulatory 
Impacts Analysis, which it had prepared as part of the OIRA review process and which 
estimated costs and benefits of the proposed regulation, played no role in the “appropriate 
and necessary” finding. Id. at 9323.  
30 White Stallion Energy Ctr., LLC. v. EPA, 748 F.3d 1222, 1222–23 (D.C. Cir. 2014) 
(per curiam). 
31 Id. at 1237. 
32 Id. at 1236–41. 
33 Id. at 1266 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting).  
34 Id. at 1259. 
35 Michigan v. EPA, 135 S. Ct. 2699, 2706–07 (2015).  
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failed in regulating HAPs, Congress designated 189 pollutants for which the EPA 
was required to develop emission standards on an expedited schedule.36 The Act also 
required the EPA to list categories of sources that emitted pollutants above certain 
quantities and then regulate those sources.37 
Notably, the Clean Air Act separately addresses the regulation of HAPs from 
power plants and nonpower plants. For sources other than power plants, the Act sets 
up a two tiered structure whereby costs are not taken into account when the EPA is 
deciding whether to regulate. 38 Rather, the Act requires the EPA to take cost into 
account when deciding at what level to regulate.39 For power plants, however, 
Congress remained silent as to cost, giving the EPA discretion to regulate HAPs 
from power plants if regulation was “appropriate and necessary.”40 
The EPA reasoned that Congress separated power plants out for special 
consideration because other newly adopted provisions of the 1990 Amendments also 
targeted power plant emissions and Congress was unsure the degree to which those 
other programs would have ancillary benefits for reducing hazardous air pollutants.41 
For example, the Title IV Acid Rain Program targeted sulfur dioxide (“SO2”) and 
nitrogen oxide (“NOx”) emissions from the largest coal fired power plants but those 
same pollution control measures might also reduce other pollutants, including 
hazardous air pollutants.42 Given the uncertainty of what might be accomplished, 
Congress instructed the EPA to study the public health hazards that were reasonably 
anticipated to occur after other regulatory programs had been implemented.43 If, 
based on the study, the EPA determined that regulation was appropriate and 
necessary, Congress directed the EPA to regulate hazardous air pollutants from 
power plants.44  
EPA submitted the required study (“Utility Study”) to Congress in 1998.45 The 
study concluded that pollution control strategies adopted by power plants to comply 
                                               
36 42 U.S.C. § 7412(b)(1) (1999).  
37 Id. § 7412(c)(1), (d)(1). 
38 The Act requires the EPA to regulate an “area source” if it “presents a threat of 
adverse effects to human health or the environment . . . warranting regulation.” Id. § 
7412(c)(3). An area source is one that emits below a certain threshold of pollutants and thus 
does not automatically qualify for regulation as a major source. Id. § 7412(a)(1), (a)(2).  
39 Id. § 7412(d)(2) (requiring the Agency to consider cost when imposing beyond the 
floor standards). 
40 Id. § 7412(n)(1)(A). 
41 Brief for the Federal Respondents at 7–8, Michigan v. EPA, 135 S. Ct. 2699 (2015) 
(Nos. 14-46, 14-47, 14-49), 2015 WL 797454 [hereinafter EPA Brief]; Brief of Industry 
Respondents Calpine Co., Exelon Co., National Grid Generation LLC, and Public Service 
Enterprise Group, Inc. at 3–4, Michigan v. EPA, 135 S. Ct. 2699 (2015) (Nos. 14-46, 14-47, 
14-49), 2015 WL 797452 [hereinafter Industry Respondent Brief]. 
42 EPA Brief, supra note 41, at 7–8; Industry Respondent Brief, supra note 41, at 3–4. 
43 42 U.S.C. § 7412(n)(1)(A). 
44 Id. 
45 EPA, STUDY OF HAZARDOUS AIR POLLUTANT EMISSIONS FROM ELECTRIC UTILITY 
STEAM GENERATING UNITS—FINAL REPORT TO CONGRESS (Feb. 1998) [hereinafter FINAL 
REPORT], http://www.epa.gov/ttn/atw/combust/utiltox/eurtc1.pdf [https://perma.cc/PEC7-
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with Title IV would not significantly reduce emissions of hazardous air pollutants.46 
In 2000, after considering the Utility Study, the EPA concluded that regulation of 
mercury emissions from power plants was appropriate and necessary.47 The EPA 
explained that electric generating units (power plants) “are the largest source of 
mercury emissions in the U.S.” and that mercury poses health risks to humans and, 
in particular, developing fetuses.48 The EPA also identified other metals and acid 
gas emissions that were of potential concern due to health impacts.49 In 2005, the 
EPA reversed course and attempted to withdraw the listing.50 That decision was 
struck down by the D.C. Circuit, which held that the EPA had failed to meet the 
delisting criteria.51 In 2012, the EPA reaffirmed the “appropriate and necessary” 
determination that it had made in 2000. That finding and the regulatory limits that 
flowed from it gave rise to the Michigan v. EPA litigation.52  
In their briefing to the Supreme Court, both parties agreed that Congress was 
silent as to whether cost was a required consideration under Section 112(n). But, as 
one would expect, the parties drew on the Act’s text, structure, and history to reach 
fundamentally divergent views on what Congress must have meant when it directed 
the EPA to regulate power plants when appropriate and necessary. There were three 
major lines of argument.  
First, the parties disagreed on whether the breadth of the term “appropriate” 
constrains the EPA’s discretion or affords the EPA the freedom to treat power plants 
similarly to other sources. On the one hand, petitioners argued that the very breadth 
of the term “appropriate” signals that Congress intended the EPA to make a policy 
judgment based on all relevant factors and that cost is necessarily a relevant factor.53 
On the other hand, the EPA and Industry Respondents argued that congressional 
silence has never been interpreted to mean that costs must be considered.54 By using 
an open ended term and by declining to set forth an exclusive list of factors, the EPA 
argued that Congress implicitly authorized it to determine when regulation is 
                                               
Q479].  
46 Id. at 13-1–13-12, 13-22–13-58.  
47 Regulatory Finding on the Emissions of Hazardous Air Pollutants From Electric 
Utility Steam Generating Units, 65 Fed. Reg. 79825, 79826 (Dec. 20, 2000). 
48 Id. at 79827–29. 
49 Id. at 79829. 
50 See Standards of Performance for New and Existing Stationary Sources: Electric 
Utility Steam Generating Units, 70 Fed. Reg. 28606, 28607–08 (May 18, 2005).  
51 New Jersey v. EPA, 517 F.3d 574, 583 (D.C. Cir. 2008). 
52 National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants From Coal-and Oil-Fired 
Electric Utility Steam Generating Units and Standards of Performance for Fossil-Fuel-Fired 
Electric Utility, Industrial-Commercial-Institutional, and Small Industrial-Commercial-
Institutional Steam Generating Units, 77 Fed. Reg. 9304, 9326 (Feb. 16, 2012). 
53 Brief of Petitioner Utility Air Regulatory Group, et al. at 32, Michigan v. EPA, 135 
S. Ct. 2699 (2015) (Nos.14-46, 14-47, 14-49) 2015 WL 272372 [hereinafter Brief of UARG] 
(urging the Court to interpret congressional silence to consider the broadest range of relevant 
factors).  
54 EPA Brief, supra note 41, at 22, 48–51; Industry Respondent Brief, supra note 41, 
at 19.  
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appropriate and did not intend to tie the EPA’s hands on whether cost should be 
considered.55 Under the EPA’s view, the broader structure of the Act shows that 
when Congress intended costs to be a factor it expressed that intent in clear and 
specific ways.56 Similarly, other provisions governing hazardous air emissions 
demonstrate that, while cost is relevant to setting emissions standards for power 
plants, cost is not a relevant factor for determining whether to regulate as a public 
health matter.57  
Second, the parties disagreed on whether the Act’s structure supports or refutes 
the EPA’s approach to regulating power plants. Petitioners for the State of Michigan 
argue that Congress intended power plants to be treated differently, as evidenced by 
its creation of Section 112(n)(1)(A) to separately govern power plants.58 As a result, 
they contend that Congress did not intend the EPA to follow the approach mandated 
for other sources.59  
The EPA argued that Congress separated power plants for special consideration 
because Congress was uncertain as to the degree to which hazardous air pollutants 
from power plants would be incidentally addressed through other programs under 
the Act; namely, the Title IV Acid Rain Program.60 The EPA argued that its 
interpretation of the Act addressed Congress’s concern and did so in a way that 
harmonized Section 112 by examining costs at the same stage for power plants as 
for other stationary sources.61 Using Congress’s own regulatory structure, the EPA 
argued, cannot be inherently unreasonable.62  
Finally, Petitioner UARG argued that the EPA’s interpretation cannot be 
reasonable because the costs of the Rule “dwarf” emission reduction benefits.63 They 
noted that the EPA estimated that the quantifiable annual costs of compliance under 
the Rule are $9.6 billion while the annual benefits from reduced emissions of 
hazardous air pollutants are only $4 to $6 million.64 This discrepancy between the 
costs and the benefits, the State of Michigan argued, is “precisely the kind of 
unreasonable and irrational result that Congress wanted to avoid when it instructed 
[the] EPA to regulate only if it determined that regulation is ‘appropriate.’”65  
In response, the EPA explained that it issued a cost benefit analysis of the new 
power plant emission standards as required by executive orders.66 Although the cost 
                                               
55 EPA Brief, supra note 41, at 20. 
56 Id. at 35–36. 
57 Id. at 19, 24–26.  
58 Brief for Petitioners State of Michigan, et al. at 37–40, Michigan v. EPA, 135 S. Ct. 
2699 (2015) (Nos.14-46, 14-47, 14-49) 2015 WL 3090902015 WL 272372 [hereinafter 
Michigan Brief].  
59 Id.  
60 EPA Brief, supra note 41, at 7–8.  
61 Id. at 24–27.  
62 Id. at 19. 
63 Brief of UARG, supra note 53, at 19. 
64 Id. 
65 Michigan Brief, supra note 58, at 32.  
66 EPA Brief, supra note 41, at 53–56. 
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benefit analysis played no role in its finding that regulating power plants is 
“appropriate and necessary,” the EPA asserted that in fact its cost benefit analysis 
confirmed that the EPA’s ultimate decision to regulate would be reasonable even if 
the agency were required to take costs into account using a cost benefit test.67 The 
cost benefit analysis projected that the new standards, once fully implemented in 
2016, would yield annual monetized benefits of between $37 and $90 billion as 
compared to annual costs of $9.6 billion.68  
In support of the EPA, Industry Respondents asserted that the standards 
imposed by the EPA’s Rule are “economically practicable and have already been 
achieved by a large portion of the power sector.”69 This, they explained, is precisely 
because the Act sets “minimum [emissions] standards . . . based on what other, 
similar sources already have achieved in practice—a test that necessarily ensures 
that standards will not impose industry-wrecking costs.”70 And in fact, in a statement 
that explains the Industry Respondents support of the Rule, they maintained that “the 
Rule levels the playing field and eliminates the perverse incentives that previously 
allowed coal-fired plants to profit by refusing to install the same emission controls 
used by their peers.”71 
Notably, the interpretation offered by the EPA would have made its approach 
to power plant emissions consistent with the approach that the statute otherwise sets 
out for other stationary sources—namely, to decide whether to regulate based on 
public health and then to set emissions standards with cost in mind. So, one way the 
Court could have resolved this case would have been through a straightforward 
application of the Chevron doctrine whereby the Court shows deference to 
reasonable agency interpretations in the face of statutory ambiguity.72 To that end, 
one could easily imagine the Court accepting the agency’s approach as reasonable 
given that Congress had followed a similar approach for nonpower plants. But that 
was not the approach taken. In fact, the Court showed very little inclination to defer 
to the EPA.  
Instead of emphasizing ambiguity and deference and expertise of agencies as 
one might expect, the Court focused on the breadth of the term “appropriate.”73 It 
used this breadth to open the door to relevance as the touchstone test. In particular, 
the Court used the language of Judge Kavanaugh in his dissenting opinion below to 
describe “appropriate” as “the classic broad and all-encompassing term that 
naturally and traditionally includes consideration of all the relevant factors.”74 In 
dealing with the Chevron doctrine, the Court explained that an agency decision must 
be reasonable to warrant deference and that a decision cannot be reasonable if the 
                                               
67 Id. at 54–55. 
68 Id. at 54. 
69 Industry Respondent Brief, supra note 41, at 1. 
70 Id. at 25–26 (emphasis in original). 
71 Id. at 30.  
72 Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843 (1984). 
73 Michigan v. EPA, 135 S. Ct. 2699, 2707 (2015). 
74 Id. (quoting White Stallion Energy Ctr., LLC v. EPA, 748 F.3d 1222, 1266) (D.C. 
Cir. 2014) (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting)).  
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agency has failed to consider all centrally relevant factors.75 By framing the question 
in this way, the Court imported the familiar arbitrary and capricious standard of 
review into the reasonableness inquiry of Chevron. Under that standard, agency 
decisions are arbitrary and capricious and therefore must be set aside by the 
reviewing court when agencies fail to consider important aspects of the problem.76  
Having established relevance as the touchstone inquiry, the Court went on to 
conclude that cost was indeed a “centrally relevant factor.”77 In doing so, the Court 
explained that the phrase “appropriate and necessary” requires at least some 
attention to cost.78 Appealing to something of a common sense line of argument the 
Court remarked: “One would not say that it is even rational, never mind 
‘appropriate,’ to impose billions of dollars in economic costs in return for a few 
dollars in health or environmental benefits.”79  
The Court also took note of the fact that “[a]gencies have long treated cost as a 
centrally relevant factor when deciding whether to regulate.”80 While the Court did 
not say so explicitly, it almost surely had in mind the Office of Information and 
Regulatory Affairs (“OIRA”) review process that systematically incorporates cost 
benefit analysis into regulatory decisionmaking.81 Against the backdrop of this 
established administrative practice, the Court finds that the congressional silence as 
to cost cannot reasonably be read as an invitation to ignore cost.82  
As expected, the Court does eventually look to the statute for support. 
Curiously, however, the detailed consideration of the statute that one has come to 
expect in Clean Air Act cases and that permeated the briefing in this case by parties 
on both sides was largely absent. Instead, the statutory examination follows rather 
than drives the analysis. As almost an afterthought, the Court remarks that its 
conclusion is consistent with the statutory context. To that end, recall that even 
though Section 112(n) is silent as to cost, Section 112(n) requires the EPA to study 
the public health hazards reasonably anticipated to occur from power plant 
emissions before making an appropriate and necessary finding.83 As the Court 
recognized, that provision—the one Congress expressly intended to serve the 
foundation of the appropriate and necessary finding—does not mention cost. 84 
However, the next provision in the statute also requires the EPA to study mercury 
                                               
75 Id.  
76 Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983). 
77 Michigan v. EPA, 135 S. Ct. at 2707.  
78 Id. 
79 Id. 
80 Id. (emphasis added).  
81 For a basic description of the role of cost-benefit analysis in the OIRA review 
process, see Cass R. Sunstein, Commentary, The Office of Information and Regulatory 
Affairs: Myths and Realities, 126 HARV. L. REV. 1838, 1845 (2013). For a lively examination 
of why the OIRA review process should be dismantled, see Rena Steinzor, The Case for 
Abolishing Centralized White House Review, 1 MICH. J. ENVTL. & ADMIN. L. 209 (2012).  
82 Michigan v. EPA, 135 S. Ct. at 2707. 
83 42 U.S.C. § 7412(n)(1)(A) (1999).  
84 Michigan v. EPA, 135 S. Ct. at 2708. 
2018] THE FLIP SIDE OF MICHIGAN V. EPA 13 
emissions from power plants, the “Mercury Study.”85 In that Mercury Study the EPA 
is directed to consider health and environmental effects as well as emission control 
technologies and “the costs of such technologies.”86 This, the Court concluded, 
evidenced Congress’s recognition of cost as a relevant consideration.87 This is a 
loose connection. 
 
B.  Michigan v. EPA as a Blueprint 
 
Michigan v. EPA is remarkable for three reasons that are relevant to 
understanding how it might serve as a blueprint for identifying other factors centrally 
relevant to nonarbitrary decisionmaking in environmental law. 
 
1.  Giving Cost Presumptive Status 
 
First, as several scholars have noted, the case creates a procost presumption.88 
That presumption is a departure from the Court’s prior opinions in this area.89 In 
previous cases, notably in Whitman v. American Trucking,90 the Court had expressly 
interpreted other provisions of the Clean Air Act to prohibit cost consideration in 
the face of congressional silence.91 Though recent cases have taken a more affirming 
                                               
85 42 U.S.C. § 7412(n)(1)(B) (1999). 
86 Id. 
87 Michigan v. EPA, 135 S. Ct. at 2708. 
88 See Lisa Heinzerling, The Power Canons, 58 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1933, 1965 
(2017) (arguing that Michigan v. EPA created a presumption); Sinden, supra note 7, at 
10,952 (“In sum, the Court in Michigan reversed EPA for failing to consider costs in the face 
of an ambiguous statute . . . and, in doing so, arguably created a broadly application pro-cost 
presumption.”); Sunstein, Cost-Benefit Analysis, supra note 15, at 14 (arguing that Michigan 
v. EPA “strongly suggests that a failure to consider costs at all is per se arbitrary.”). Cf. 
Sinden, supra note 7, at 10,951 (acknowledging that the Court’s decision creates a pro-cost 
presumption, and noting that other scholars have read it that way, but taking a more tempered 
view: “With some reading between the lines, however, one can arguably discern in [the] 
opinion at least the outlines of a pro-cost presumption.”).  
89 Sinden, supra note 7, at 10,933–34 (“But while earlier ruling simply ratified agency 
decisions to consider costs, Michigan marks the first time the Supreme Court has actually 
forced cost considerations on an unwilling agency.”); Jonathan S. Masur & Eric A. Posner, 
Cost-Benefit Analysis and the Judicial Role 36 (Coarse-Sandor Working Paper Series in L. 
and Econ., Working Paper No. 787, 2017) (describing Michigan as an interpretation that 
“represents a significant evolution from its position in Whitman v. American Trucking.”). 
90 531 U.S. 457 (2001). 
91 See id. at 467 (“We have therefore refused to find implicit in ambiguous sections of 
the [Clean Air Act] an authorization to consider costs that has elsewhere, and so often, been 
expressly granted.”) (citing Union Elec. Co. v. EPA, 427 U.S. 246, 257 & n.5 (1976); see 
also Am. Textile Mfrs. Inst., Inc. v. Donovan, 452 U.S. 490, 510 (1981) (“When Congress 
has intended that an agency engage in cost-benefit analysis, it has clearly indicated such 
intent on the face of the statute.”); see also Sinden, supra note 7, at 10,933 n.4 (citation 
omitted). 
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position on cost consideration within public health statutes like the Clean Air Act, 
the Court had only gone so far as interpreting the statute to allow the agency to 
consider cost.92 Allowing agencies to consider cost remains a far cry from requiring 
agencies to consider cost even when Congress has not spoken to the issue. Still, both 
the majority and dissent endorse Michigan’s conclusion that cost is an indispensable 
consideration.93 The difference, of course, is that the dissent argued that the EPA 
had considered cost, just at a later stage.94  
Scholars debate the significance of the Court’s departure in Michigan for what 
it means in terms of the future of cost benefit analysis.95 Professor Cass Sunstein 
argues that the reach of the procost presumption might seem “quite modest” but that 
“it is far less so than it might appear.”96 Sunstein urges that the consideration of cost 
“requires agencies to weigh costs against benefits, at least in some sense.”97 Of note, 
Sunstein has long advocated for a more central role of cost benefit analysis in the 
regulatory state and argued that courts have applied and should continue to apply 
procost interpretative cannons.98  
Professor Amy Sinden, however, cautions against conflating a procost position 
with the embrace of formal cost benefit analysis.99 She explains “both the majority 
and the dissent took pains to make clear that they were not requiring agencies ‘to 
conduct a formal cost-benefit analysis in which each advantage and disadvantage is 
assigned a monetary value.’”100 The reason why one should be careful not to conflate 
a presumption in favor of cost consideration and a presumption in favor of formal 
cost benefit analysis, Sinden further explains, is the myriad of shortcomings with the 
ability of cost benefit analysis to capture social public health values at the core of 
environmental law.101  
For purposes of this Article, the particular contours or resolution of the Sinden-
Sunstein debate is not as important as the general consensus among scholars that the 
Court did in fact recognize cost as a centrally relevant factor even in the face of 
                                               
92 See Entergy Corp. v. Riverkeeper, Inc., 556 U.S. 208, 226 (2009) (upholding the 
EPA’s use of cost benefit analysis, though not requiring it).  
93 Michigan v. EPA, 135 S. Ct. 2699, 2716–17 (2015) (Kagan, J., dissenting) (“Cost is 
almost always a relevant—and usually, a highly important—factor in regulation. Unless 
Congress provides otherwise, an agency acts unreasonably in establishing a standard-setting 
process that ignores economic considerations.”) (internal quotation marks omitted) (citation 
omitted).  
94 See id.  
95 Compare Sinden, supra note 7, with Sunstein, supra note 15. 
96 Sunstein, Cost-Benefit Analysis, supra note 15, at 14. 
97 Id. 
98 See Sunstein, Cost-Benefit Default Principles, supra note 5, at 1655 (“[T]here can be 
no doubt that the cost-benefit default principles have emerged as a central part of what 
amounts to the federal common law of regulatory policy.”); see also CASS R. SUNSTEIN, THE 
COST-BENEFIT STATE: THE FUTURE OF REGULATORY PROTECTION (2002). 
99 See generally Sinden, supra note 7, at 10,934 (explaining there is a “fairly wide gulf 
between” the Court’s pro-cost posture and a formal cost benefit analysis). 
100 Id.  
101 Id. at 10,956. 
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congressional silence. This presumptive nature of the Court’s conclusion raises the 
possibility that there are other relevant factors that too are so central to nonarbitrary 
decisionmaking that they can be required in the face of congressional silence. For 
that reason, the Court’s departure from previous cases is remarkable.  
 
2.  Dispensing with Deference 
 
In addition to its procost position, Michigan is also remarkable for its decidedly 
lukewarm attitude towards agency deference. Because the case turns on an issue of 
statutory interpretation, the issue of how much deference to afford the EPA is 
resolved under the familiar two step framework announced in under Chevron U.S.A. 
Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council.102 Under that framework, courts begin 
by asking whether Congress has spoken to the particular statutory issue.103 If it has, 
that is the end of the matter for the courts must follow the intent of Congress.104 If 
Congress has not spoken to the issue—put differently, if the statute is ambiguous—
courts proceed to the second step of the analysis and ask if the agency’s 
interpretation is reasonable.105 Here, because the statute was silent as to 
consideration of cost, and congressional intent was otherwise unclear, the Court 
appears to have grappled with the reasonableness of the agency’s interpretation 
under step two of Chevron.106  
Ordinarily, agencies enjoy an impressively high victory rate under step two of 
the Chevron framework.107 Some empirical studies from the 1990s have shown that 
agencies win 89% of the time under a step two analysis.108 In a relatively uncommon 
                                               
102 467 U.S. 837, 843 (1984). 
103 Id. at 841–43. 
104 Id. 
105 Id. at 843. 
106 See Michigan v. EPA, 135 S. Ct. 2699, 2707 (2015) (recognizing that agencies 
deserve deference when interpreting ambiguous statutory provisions but that they still “must 
operate within the bounds of reasonable interpretation.”). 
107 See, e.g., Kristin E. Hickman & Matthew B. Krueger, In Search of the Modern 
Skidmore Standard, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 1235, 1276–77 (2007) (discussing and assembling 
the literature on the high rate of success of government litigants under Chevron, Skidmore, 
and more generally). Cf. William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Lauren E. Baer, The Continuum of 
Deference: Supreme Court Treatment of Agency Statutory Interpretations from Chevron to 
Hamdan, 96 GEO. L.J. 1083, 1090 (2008) (presenting empirical work suggesting that 
discerning deference patterns may be the work of a more complicated set of nuanced factors 
that cannot be adequately captured by simple calculations of success rates, like, for example, 
the court’s decision to invoke a deference doctrine at all). 
108 See Orin S. Kerr, Shedding Light on Chevron: An Empirical Study on the Chevron 
Doctrine in the U.S. Courts of Appeals, 15 YALE J. ON REG. 1, 31 (1998) (citing an 89% 
success rate at step two in a study of all federal courts of appeals in 1995 and 1996); 
Christopher H. Schroeder & Robert L. Glicksman, Chevron, State Farm and the EPA in the 
Courts of Appeals During the 1990s, 31 ENVTL. L. REP. 1, 15 (2001) (finding about a 92% 
success rate at step two in the 1990s in the courts of appeals); see also Patricia M. Wald, A 
Response to Tiller and Cross, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 235, 243 (1999) (discussing a study of the 
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move, however, Michigan struck down the agency’s interpretation as being 
unreasonable.109 Some scholars and lower courts have taken the Court’s behavior to 
signal the Chevron doctrine’s erosion, or at the very least an invitation to take a more 
searching review under step two.110 The Court’s examination and conclusion in step 
two does look an awful lot like a step one analysis. The majority makes clear there 
is no room for a contrary interpretation: “Read naturally in the present context, the 
phrase ‘appropriate and necessary’ requires at least some attention to cost. One 
would not say that it is even rational, never mind ‘appropriate,’ to impose billions 
of dollars in economic costs in return for a few dollars in health or environmental 
benefits.”111 If, as the Court concludes, it is not even rational to interpret the Clean 
Air Act in the way the EPA proposed, one would be hard pressed to see how the 
Court would accept another interpretation as reasonable.112 Indeed, Justice Scalia 
observed that “[o]ne does not need to open up a dictionary” to reach that 
conclusion.113 This kind of firm position on what the statute requires is typically the 
hallmark of step one cases, which is sometimes framed as charging judges with 
discerning whether there is a singular permissible interpretation prescribed by 
Congress.114  
                                               
D.C. Circuit reporting that only 11% of reversals of agency decisions occur at step two of 
Chevron). 
109 Michigan v. EPA, 135 S. Ct. at 2708.  
110 See, e.g., Gutierrez–Brizuela v. Lynch, 834 F.3d 1142, 1154 (10th Cir. 2016) 
(Gorsuch, J., concurring) (citing Michigan v. EPA as lever to question agency deference); 
Synopsys, Inc. v. Mentor Graphics Corp., 814 F.3d 1309, 1332 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (Newman, 
J., dissenting) (citing to Michigan v. EPA as he advocated for taking a harder look at agency 
decisions under step two of Chevron); NRDC v. EPA, 808 F.3d 556, 569 (2d Cir. 2015) 
(relying on Michigan v. EPA to set up a more searching review of an agency’s statutory 
interpretation and alleged failure to consider relevant factors); Heinzerling, supra note 88, at 
1943 (citing Michigan v. EPA in a group of cases that “suggest that at least several justices 
are in a bad mood about Chevron, and for that reason alone these cases may portend more 
trouble ahead for administrative interpretations.”); Connor Schratz, Michigan v. EPA and 
the Erosion of Chevron Deference, 68 ME. L. REV. 381, 394–96 (2016); see also Thomas A. 
Lorenzen & Sharmistha Das, The Decline of Deference: Is the Supreme Court Pruning Back 
the Chevron Doctrine, 47 TRENDS (ABA Section of Env’t, Energy and Resources, Chi., Ill.), 
Sept.–Oct. 2015 at 3 (suggesting the approach to Chevron is here to stay but is being 
substantially “prune[d]” by the Supreme Court). 
111 Michigan v. EPA, 135 S. Ct. at 2707. 
112 Even though this case functions like a Step One case—whereby the opinion leaves 
no room for a contrary, nonarbitrary interpretation—the Court was correct to approach this 
case under Step Two given that the Court’s procost conclusion was derived more from 
generalized principles than the statute itself. Id. In other words, the Court would have been 
hard-pressed to couch this decision in terms of congressional intent, which is the inquiry that 
lies at the heart of the Step One. Id.  
113 Id. 
114 See Nat’l Cable & Telecomms. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 982–
85 (2005) (“A court’s prior judicial construction of a statute trumps an agency construction 
otherwise entitled to Chevron deference only if the prior court decision holds that its 
construction follows from the unambiguous terms of the statute and thus leaves no room for 
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One reason why the Court’s decision approaches the conviction of a step one 
analysis could be because the Court imports the arbitrary and capricious standard of 
review into the step two inquiry. In doing so, the Court sheds the bounded scriptures 
of agency deference and considers relevance as judged by less technical standards. 
In other words, by importing arbitrary and capricious review into the step two 
analysis, the Court is able to shed the norms of agency deference under step two and 
the theoretical underpinnings of Chevron that give agencies power to fill policy gaps 
left by Congress.115 Arbitrary and capricious review is not so constrained and has a 
simpler aim of ensuring agencies wield their power with reason and transparent 
rationales.116 Leading administrative law scholar Thomas Merrill long ago observed 
that the Chevron doctrine “allows courts to retreat into an apolitical, law finding 
function” whereas arbitrary and capricious review “seems to inject them in the 
middle of the policymaking process.”117  
                                               
agency discretion. This principle follows from Chevron itself.”); How Chevron Step One 
Limits Permissible Agency Interpretations: Brand X and the FCC’s Broadband 
Reclassification, 124 HARV. L. REV. 1016 (2011). Cf. Matthew C. Stephenson & Adrian 
Vermeule, Chevron Has Only One Step, 95 VA. L. REV. 597, 605 (2009) (arguing that a 
narrow construction of step one is detrimental “insofar as judges believe that Step One 
requires them to ascertain whether the statute has a single, clear meaning before deciding 
whether the agency’s interpretation is reasonable, the two-step structure may actually 
undermine some of the values that Chevron deference is supposed to advance.”).  
115 Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843–44 (1984); 
Encino Motorcars, LLC v. Navarro, 136 S. Ct. 2117, 2125 (2016) (“A premise of Chevron 
is that when Congress grants an agency the authority to administer a statute by issuing 
regulations with the force of law, it presumes the agency will use that authority to resolve 
ambiguities in the statutory scheme.”).  
116 See Kathryn A. Watts, Proposing a Place for Politics in Arbitrary and Capricious 
Review, 119 YALE L.J. 2, 16−17 (2009) (explaining that “various prominent judges on the 
D.C. Circuit crafted a ramped up version of ‘arbitrary and capricious’ review—called ‘hard 
look’ review—that enabled courts to scrutinize agency decisions and to ensure that the public 
interest was being served” and that the Supreme Court embraced this approach in Motor 
Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins., 463 U.S. 29 (1983)); Reuel E. Schiller, 
Enlarging the Administrative Polity: Administrative Law and the Changing Definition of 
Pluralism, 1945–1970, 53 VAND. L. REV. 1389, 1421–23 (2000) (explaining that the various 
hard look decisions in the 1960s and 1970s “indicated the degree to which fears of agency 
capture and a general suspicion of the administrative process drove intense judicial review.”); 
Thomas W. Merrill, Capture Theory and the Courts: 1967–1983, 72 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 
1039, 1052 (1997) (“[C]apture theory also suggests that aggressive judicial oversight and 
control of agencies is needed in order to counteract the distortions of the administrative 
process introduced by interest group capture and other pathologies.”).  
117 Merrill, supra note 116, at 1096. See also Patrick M. Garry, The Unannounced 
Revolution: How the Court Has Indirectly Effected a Shift in the Separation of Powers, 57 
ALA. L. REV. 689, 711 (2006) (“[T]he Hard-Look Doctrine permits the courts to intrude into 
agency action much more than they could ever intrude into the workings of Congress.”); 
Richard J. Pierce, Jr., The Appropriate Role of Costs in Environmental Regulation, 54 
ADMIN. L. REV. 1237, 1264 (2002) (“Extensive empirical research has documented the 
existence of a powerful tendency for judges to act in accordance with their partisan political 
18 UTAH LAW REVIEW [NO. 1 
In addition, by importing arbitrariness review into Chevron step two, the Court 
gains access to a wide range of moods that characterize arbitrary and capricious 
review—some deferential and some much less so. To that end, arbitrary and 
capricious standard of review does not impose a one size fits all degree of 
deference.118 In Citizens to Pres. Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe,119 one of the leading 
cases to define the arbitrary and capricious standard, the Supreme Court at the same 
time describes the standard of review as “narrow” while also as “searching and 
careful.”120 This formulation allows courts to take a range of approaches, depending 
on the skepticism with which the court sees the agency’s position. For example, at 
times courts display an eager willingness to defer to agency expertise by invoking 
the useful mantra that “a court is not to substitute its judgment for that of the 
agency.”121 Similarly, those with a penchant for deference might also elect to 
“uphold a decision of less than ideal clarity if the agency’s path may reasonably be 
discerned.”122 On the other hand, those harboring a more skeptical view, of agencies 
generally or of the outcome in particular, could hang a decision of less than ideal 
clarity out to dry by refusing to “supply a reasoned basis for the agency’s action that 
the agency itself has not given.”123 These competing mantras provide a sort of 
choose-your-own-adventure within the world of agency deference and arbitrariness 
review.124 By framing reasonableness as a question of arbitrariness and thus 
                                               
preferences when they apply that version of the arbitrary and capricious test to the EPA’s 
actions.”); cf. Jonathan Cannon, The Sounds of Silence: Cost-Benefit Canons in Entergy 
Corp. v. Riverkeeper, Inc., 34 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 425, 448 (2010) (arguing that 
collapsing the two steps of the Chevron inquiry broadens the scope of judicial review). 
118 See Sidney A. Shapiro & Richard E. Levy, Judicial Incentives and Indeterminacy in 
Substantive Review of Administrative Decisions, 44 DUKE L.J. 1051, 1065−66 (1995) 
(“[T]he arbitrary and capricious standard is relatively open-ended, and the Supreme Court 
has not given it more precise content.”); see also Louis J. Virelli III, Deconstructing 
Arbitrary and Capricious Review, 92 N.C. L. REV. 721, 728, 733 (2014) (stating that the 
Supreme Court has “applied the concept of arbitrariness differently in a wide range of cases” 
and positing that the standard is in fact “multidimensional”). 
119 401 U.S. 402 (1971).  
120 Id. at 416.  
121 FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 556 U.S. 502, 513 (2009) (quoting Motor 
Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins., 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983) (internal quotation 
marks omitted)).  
122 Id. at 513−14 (quoting Bowman Transp., Inc. v. Ark.-Best Freight System, Inc., 419 
U.S. 281, 286 (1974) (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
123 Encino Motorcars, LLC v. Navarro, 136 S. Ct. 2117, 2127 (2016) (vacating the 
agency’s decision after finding the agency’s reasoning inadequate and admonishing that “[i]t 
is not the role of the courts to speculate on reasons that might have supported an agency’s 
decision”).  
124 See Am. Radio Relay League, Inc. v. FCC, 524 F.3d 227, 248 (D.C. Cir. 2008) 
(Kavanaugh, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (explaining that the “[a]pplication 
of the beefed-up arbitrary-and-capricious test is inevitably if not inherently unpredictable—
so much so that, on occasion, the courts’ arbitrary-and-capricious review itself appears 
arbitrary and capricious”); see also Adam Babich, Fun with Administrative Law: A Game for 
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relevance, the Court in Michigan uncuffed itself and was free to adopt a more 
skeptical attitude towards agency deference.125  
Michigan is certainly not the first time that courts merged reasonableness under 
Chevron’s step two with the arbitrary and capricious standard.126 Scholars have long 
debated the wisdom of doing so.127 But while the approach is not new, Michigan 
inspires some useful observations. For one, it illustrates that there is sufficient 
flexibility in the administrative law frameworks for courts to approach statutory 
ambiguities with a measure of context, common sense, and pragmatism.128 It 
                                               
Lawyers and Judges, 4 MICH. J. ENVTL. & ADMIN. L. 341, 349−53 (2015) (collecting cases 
in tabular form to show that for every guiding principle of administrative law, there is 
contrasting principle that can be used to urge an opposite result). 
125 See Merrill, supra note 116, at 1040 (arguing that the emergence of the hard look 
doctrine as a characterization of arbitrariness review was part of a larger series of doctrinal 
transformations that shifted power from agencies to courts); Richard J. Pierce, Jr., What Do 
the Studies of Judicial Review of Agency Actions Mean?, 63 ADMIN. L. REV. 77, 97 (2011) 
(“I now share the view of many scholars that courts will never announce a doctrine that 
cannot accommodate the powerful tendency of judges and Justices to act in ways that are 
consistent with their strongly held political and ideological perspectives.”). But see Jack M. 
Beermann, End the Failed Chevron Experiment Now: How Chevron Has Failed and Why It 
Can and Should Be Overruled, 42 CONN. L. REV. 779, 784 (2010).  
126 See Kenneth A. Bamberger & Peter L. Strauss, Chevron’s Two Steps, 95 VA. L. 
REV. 611, 621 (2009) (“Courts and commentators have converged on an emerging consensus 
that the ‘arbitrary, capricious, and abuse of discretion’ standard set forth in [the 
Administrative Procedure Act’s (APA)] Section 706(2)(A) supplies the metric for judicial 
oversight at Chevron’s second step.”); Judulang v. Holder, 565 U.S. 42, 52 n.7 (2011) 
(suggesting that the arbitrary and capricious standard of review and the Chevron step two 
analysis are “the same”); Nat’l Ass’n of Regulatory Util. Comm’rs v. ICC, 41 F.3d 721, 727 
(D.C. Cir. 1994) (noting that “the inquiry at the second step of Chevron overlaps analytically 
with a court’s task under the [APA] . . . in determining whether agency action is arbitrary 
and capricious (unreasonable).”) (citation omitted); see also Encino Motorcars, LLC v. 
Navarro, 136 S. Ct. 2117, 2125 (2016) (weaving together the Chevron framework and 
arbitrariness review by explaining that a procedurally flawed rule cannot get Chevron 
deference and that a rule is flawed when the agency has failed to give adequate explanations 
of its decision).  
127 See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, Law and Administration After Chevron, 90 COLUM. L. 
REV. 2071, 2105 (1990) (noting that Chevron’s “reasonableness inquiry should probably be 
seen as similar to the inquiry into whether the agency’s decision is ‘arbitrary’ or ‘capricious’ 
within the meaning of the APA”); cf. Beermann, supra note 125, at 782−84 (describing how 
“the Chevron doctrine has failed” on multiple grounds including lack of clarity and 
inadequate theoretical foundation). Compare Stephenson & Vermeule, supra note 114, at 
604 (suggesting that conflation of arbitrariness review and the reasonableness inquiry is not 
a good idea and that instead Chevron should be reduced to a single step), with Ronald M. 
Levin, The Anatomy of Chevron: Step Two Reconsidered, 72 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1253, 1276 
(1997) (urging that “the D.C. Circuit’s strenuous efforts to divide up the terrain between 
arbitrariness review and Chevron step two should be abandoned; the court, as well as other 
courts, would do better simply to treat these two modes of analysis as equivalent”). 
128 For an empirical pathway to a similar conclusion, see Eskridge, Jr. & Baer, supra 
note 107, at 1090 (“[O]ur most striking finding is that in the majority of cases—53.6% of 
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particularly shows the flexibility at the interface between Chevron’s reasonableness 
inquiry and the arbitrariness review. Another, slightly different, way to cast this 
flexibility is to observe that the outcome in Michigan does not depend on the 
administrative law frame—that factors which are presumptively indispensable to 
nonarbitrary decisionmaking must be considered regardless of whether the case is 
cast as step one, step two. Either way, this flexibility is useful to bear in mind when 
considering whether there is room for courts to recognize other centrally relevant 
factors, beyond cost. 
 
3.  Embracing a Nontechnical Explanation and Generalized Application 
 
The third aspect of Michigan v. EPA that makes it a remarkable case is the 
nontechnical nature of its analysis. To that end, the Clean Air Act is a notoriously 
complex statute and issues of statutory interpretation are usually a delicate parsing 
of text to ascertain nuanced insight into congressional intent.129 But that is not the 
approach that the Court took in deciding whether Congress was clear, or the agency 
was reasonable. Rather, in reaching its conclusion, the Court invoked generalized 
appeals to rationality more than the usual intricacies of textual analysis and statutory 
interpretation. The Court sought only a loose statutory connection to justify its 
broader reaching statement of regulatory policy. Only after concluding that cost 
must be considered when the statute is “read naturally,” that the agency has long 
recognized cost as a centrally relevant factor, and that a contrary reading would be 
unreasonable, only then does the Court venture beyond the phrase “appropriate and 
necessary” to consider its broader statutory context. Indeed, in stating that “the 
statutory context reinforces the relevance of cost,” the Court leaves the distinct 
impression that the statutory context is playing second fiddle to more generalized 
principles of relevance. 
                                               
them—the Court does not apply any deference regime at all. Instead, it relies on ad hoc 
judicial reasoning of the sort that typifies the Court’s methodology in regular statutory 
interpretation cases.”); see also Thomas W. Merrill, Textualism and the Future of the 
Chevron Doctrine, 72 WASH. U. L. Q. 351, 359 (1994) (“I found that the Court applied the 
Chevron framework to less than half the cases that presented a question of deference . . . .”); 
Linda Jellum, Chevron’s Demise: A Survey of Chevron from Infancy to Senescence, 59 
ADMIN. L. Rev. 725, 738 (2007) (noting that “[d]eference was based on pragmatism” under 
pre-Chevron deference frameworks like Skidmore). Professor Jellum argues that Chevron 
“shifted the basis for deference from pragmatism to implied congressional delegation and 
democratic theory.” Id.; cf. David Zaring, Rule by Reasonableness, 63 ADMIN. L. REV. 525, 
526−28 (2011) (contending that the court ought to adopt a uniform rule of reasonableness in 
place of specific review doctrines of agency action). 
129 For a case in which the Supreme Court approaches an issue of statutory 
interpretation under the Clean Air Act in marked contrast to Michigan, see EPA v. EME 
Homer City Generation, 134 S. Ct. 1584 (2014). In that case the Court started with a detailed 
textual analysis and then admonished the lower court for allowing pragmatism to rewrite the 
text. See id. at 1601 (“The practical difficulties cited by the Court of Appeals do not justify 
departure from the Act’s plain text.”).  
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Prominent scholars have commented on the common sense approach taken by 
the Court in Michigan v. EPA.130 Professor Lisa Heinzerling goes so far as to 
proclaim the analysis “scarcely a legal argument at all.”131 She notes that the opinion 
was not rooted in “predictions about congressional behavior or preferences. It is an 
argument based on the Justices’ own judgments about sensible regulatory policy.”132  
Notably, the Court’s analysis is not only nontechnical, but it is also 
generalizable. In other words, a broad reading of the case would make it applicable 
beyond the confines of the Clean Air Act.133 To that end, Sunstein describes the 
conclusion of the Court as “quite general and not limited to a particular provision of 
the Clean Air Act.”134 And while Sunstein acknowledges that it would be possible 
to understand the holding as limited to the statute, he cautions “that would be a 
mistake.”135 To the extent that the opinion crosses statutory borders and identifies 
cost as a commonly shared aspect of rational decisionmaking, some commenters 
have noted that it is unusual.136  
 
* * * 
 
In its simplest form, Michigan v. EPA sheds the usual niceties of deferring to 
agencies in the face of ambiguity on the grounds that cost is an indispensable part of 
nonarbitrary decisionmaking. Michigan’s procost presumption, importation of an 
arbitrary and capricious review, and its common sense approach to relevance tells a 
story where deference to agency interpretation does not trump the pragmatic role 
that the judiciary plays in identifying the backbone of rational decisionmaking. It 
                                               
130 See Daniel A. Farber, Taking Costs into Account: Mapping the Boundaries of 
Judicial and Agency Discretion, 40 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 87, 108 (2016) (“The Justices 
seemed to find the relevance of cost to be merely a matter of common sense, requiring no 
explanation.”); Heinzerling, supra note 88, at 1985 (“[T]he Michigan canon appears not to 
turn on specific statutory language. Justice Scalia offered it as a general principle of rational 
agency decision-making . . . .”); Sinden, supra note 7, at 10,951 (describing a broad read of 
Michigan v. EPA as an assemblage of “links” between “cost consideration, long-standing 
agency practice, and rationality.”). 
131 Heinzerling, supra note 88, at 1968.  
132 Id. 
133 Compare the breadth of the holding in Michigan v. EPA with Whitman v. Am. 
Trucking Ass’ns, 531 U.S. 457 (2001), another Justice Scalia opinion involving consideration 
of cost under the Clean Air Act in which the anticost presumption was specifically limited 
to the statutory provision at issue. 
134 Sunstein, supra note 15, at 15. Similarly, Professor Heinzerling characterizes the 
generalizable principles created in Michigan v. EPA as an ideologically driven “power 
canon” that will “almost inevitably, be unpredictable in application.” Heinzerling, supra note 
88, at 1985.  
135 Sunstein, Cost-Benefit Analysis, supra note 15, at 15.  
136 See Clean Air Act–Cost-Benefit Analysis, supra note 17, at 311–20 (“The Court has 
never before held that one particular factor is ‘relevant’ or ‘an important aspect of the 
problem’ in every case. Rather, the Court has evaluated regulatory decisions holistically and 
contextually, based on each agency’s particular statutory mandate and reasoning process.”). 
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also tells a story where the reasoning is drawn less from the precise statutory context 
and more from general principles and common sense.  
Taking Michigan v. EPA to its logical conclusion and fully respecting the goal 
of rational decisionmaking, one might ask whether there are other centrally relevant 
factors that are indispensable to regulatory decisionmaking in environmental law. In 
considering the answer to that question, the following set of guideposts might prove 
useful: 
• First, centrally relevant factors work across statutory borders and are 
common to a broad enterprise of rational decisionmaking.  
• Second, a highly technical or rigid reading of a particular statute does not 
drive the identification of a centrally relevant factor. Relatedly, congressional 
silence does not preclude the creation of a presumptively required factor.  
• Third, pragmatism and common sense have a guiding role in identifying 
centrally relevant factors. Their existence is bolstered by a pattern of agency 
practice.  
 
PART II:  MAKING THE CASE FOR CUMULATIVE IMPACTS AS CENTRALLY 
RELEVANT 
 
Cumulative impacts—that is, the public health and ecological consequences of 
collective action over time and space—lie at the heart of the problems that Congress 
set out to solve when it adopted the body of statutes that make up environmental 
law. In fact, so pervasive is the pattern of congressional concern for cumulative 
impacts and so foundational is the consideration of cumulative impacts to the 
understanding of regulatory utility that cumulative impacts, like costs, are a centrally 
relevant factor in environmental decisionmaking. If this is true, under the logic of 
Michigan, cumulative impacts must be meaningfully considered in order for 
regulatory decisions to be valid (unless Congress has expressly disavowed the 
consideration of cumulative impacts in a particular setting).  
To make the case for cumulative impacts as a centrally relevant factor, this Part 
starts with an examination of how the study of interrelationships between living 
beings and their abiotic environment drives the environmental sciences. This Part 
goes on to consider how this driving question and universally accepted scientific 
principle is embodied in the major environmental statutes. Together, the science and 
the law point to a simple but important conclusion: understanding how regulatory 
frameworks further the goal of preserving the healthful interconnectivity of humans 
and their environment is, therefore, in many ways even more foundational to 
environmental decisionmaking than cost. 
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A.  Interconnectivity as the Scientific Foundation for Environmental Law: 
“Let’s start at the very beginning. A very good place to start.”137 
 
The most basic place to begin this line of logic is with the very simple 
observation that people and land are connected. Individual actions are connected in 
time and space. In fact, understanding of this connectivity is the basis for numerous 
scientific fields including ecology,138 physiology,139 and environmental science.140 
These fields are based on the clear understanding, and empirical demonstration, that 
life, and the environment in which it thrives, stems from complex and dynamic 
connections among living and nonliving systems. 
Cataloging the myriad interrelationships that drive life on Earth would be 
impossible. A few examples, however, can help highlight the importance of 
understanding environmental systems and relationships, not singular impacts 
considered in isolation. 
 
1.  Climate Change 
 
Climate change provides several lessons about the interlinked nature of 
planetary systems. For example, consider how the land is connected to the 
atmosphere through carbon sequestration. The integrity of the land systems like 
forest, soil, and peatlands can influence the amount of carbon dioxide that is 
absorbed from or released into the atmosphere.141 When these ecosystems are 
                                               
137 RICHARD RODGERS, Do-Re-Mi Lyrics, in THE SOUND OF MUSIC (Rodgers and 
Hammerstein 1959).  
138 See What does ecology have to do with me?, ECOL. SOC’Y AM., 
https://www.esa.org/esa/education-and-diversity/what-does-ecology-have-to-do-with-me/ 
[https://perma.cc/2H4P-GBW2] (“Ecology is the study of the relationships between living 
organisms, including humans, and their physical environment; it seeks to understand the vital 
connections between plants and animals and the world around them.”). 
139 What is Physiology?, AM. PHYSIOLOGICAL SOC’Y, http://www.the-
aps.org/mm/Careers/Ugrad/What-is-Physiology [https://perma.cc/DDV4-2AMZ] 
(“Physiology is the study of life, specifically, how cells, tissues, and organisms function. 
Physiologists are constantly trying to answer key questions in areas ranging from the 
functions of single cells to the interactions between human populations and our 
environment . . . .”). 
140 What is Environmental Science?, ENVTL. SCI., http://www.environmentalscience. 
org/ [https://perma.cc/47LH-BQA6] (“Environmental science is the study of the effects of 
natural and unnatural processes, and of interactions of the physical components of the planet 
on the environment.”). 
141 Todd A. Ontl & Lisa A. Schulte, Soil Carbon Storage, NATURE EDU. KNOWLEDGE 
PROJECT (2012), https://www.nature.com/scitable/knowledge/library/soil-carbon-storage-
84223790 [https://perma.cc/XU53-CPZV]; R. Lal, Soil Carbon Sequestration Impacts on 
Global Climate Change and Food Security, 304 SCI. MAG. 1623, 1625–26 (June 11, 2004) 
(identifying the pathways to carbon sequestration and flux across the globe and discusses the 
potential for changing land use approaches for reducing atmospheric carbon emission and 
climate change, as well as increasing food security); R. A. Houghton & J. L. Hackler, 
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converted to agriculture and pasture lands, their capacity for carbon sequestration is 
reduced. The carbon that could otherwise have been sequestered is instead released 
into the atmosphere, contributing to climate change.  
As another example, ocean acidification shows how water and air systems are 
connected. To that end, increasing atmospheric carbon causes increasing ocean 
temperatures, which in turn results in increasing acidity of seawater.142 This acidity 
can have widespread effects on sea creatures, which in turn would adversely impact 
biodiversity and commercial harvests. The most obviously and directly affected 
species are those that rely on carbonate structures like corals and shellfish; but 
because corals are home to a great number of marine species, acidification is 
expected to affect a wide range of organisms.143 
 
2.  Environmental Chemicals 
 
For another complex set of lessons about the human influence on ambient 
environmental conditions and living systems, consider the impacts of the Chemicals 
Age on the environment. It is no secret that chemicals are everywhere as a result of 
consumer products, pesticides, and industrial waste.144 The release of chemicals into 
the environment by multiple parties from multiple sources over time results in the 
uptake of those chemicals by numerous species. 145 And that uptake has 
physiological consequences.146 In fact, as a reminder that life often comes full circle, 
                                               
Changes in Terrestrial Carbon Storage in the United States I: The Roles of Agriculture and 
Forestry, 9 GLO. ECOLOGY & BIOGEOGRAPHY 125, 125, 136 (2000) (using a model that 
incorporates change in land use primarily from forest to cropland over 200 years in the 
United States to estimate changes in carbon emissions resulting from loss or gain of carbon 
sequestration).  
142 Scott C. Doney et al., Ocean Acidification: The Other CO2 Problem, 1 ANN. REV. 
MARINE SCI. 169, 169 (2009) (“The process of ocean acidification is well documented in 
field data, and the rate will accelerate over this century unless future CO2 emissions are 
curbed dramatically.”).  
143 Ocean Acidification, SMITHSONIAN OCEAN PORTAL (2016), 
http://ocean.si.edu/ocean-acidification [https://perma.cc/JU58-AUUM]. 
144 For a discussion of policy implications of chemicals proliferation, see Sanne H. 
Knudsen, Regulating Cumulative Risk, 101 MINN. L. REV. 2313, 2382–95 (2017).  
145 See Frances Orton & Charles R. Tyler, Do Hormone-modulating Chemicals Impact 
on Reproduction and Development of Wild Amphibians?, 90 BIOL. REV. 1100 (2015) 
(summarizing the impacts of endocrine disrupting chemicals on a wide range of organisms); 
Sergio Manzetti et al., Chemical Properties, Environmental Fate, and Degradation of Seven 
Classes of Pollutants, 27 CHEMICAL RES. IN TOXICOLOGY 713, 724 (2014) (discussing 
biological effects of common pollutants and noting they are indicated widely as affecting 
reproductive systems and acting as carcinogens).  
146 See Orton & Tyler, supra note 145, at 1101–02; Manzetti et al., supra note 145, at 
724; Kjell Einar Erikstad et al., High Levels of Organochlorines May Affect Hatching Sex 
Ratio and Hatchling Body Mass in Arctic Glaucous Gulls, 25 FUNCTIONAL ECOLOGY 289, 
289–95 (2011) (reporting the results of a field study indicating that female organochlorine 
levels impact the sex ratios of their offspring. If a mother has high organochlorine levels she 
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some toxins bioaccumulate in the tissues of predator species and are later consumed 
by humans.147 For example, mercury emissions by power plants followed by 
mercury accumulation in fish followed by the concomitant advisory warnings 
regarding human consumption is a relatively simple reminder that we are 
connected.148  
For a more complicated, harder to regulate, example of risk from cumulative 
exposure to certain classes of chemicals, consider the growing concerns about 
exposure to endocrine disrupting chemicals. These chemicals are used in numerous 
consumer products and released into the environment.149 As part of its biomonitoring 
research, the Center for Disease Control reported that its scientists found Bisphenol 
A (“BPA”) “in the urine of nearly all of the people tested, which indicates 
widespread exposure to BPA in the U.S. population.”150 BPA is one of several such 
chemicals that demonstrates a potential to alter endocrine function and sexual 
development.151 The ubiquitous nature of these disruptors has caused medical 
researchers to consider whether the phenomena of early puberty onset in children is 
the result of cumulative exposure to endocrine disrupting chemicals.152 The potential 
consequences of repeated exposure to endocrine disrupting chemicals is a good 
example of how we are connected in space and time—it suggests that consequences 
are neither the result of an isolated exposure nor are the impacts instantaneous, and 
yet the nature of the consequences could alter the reproductive capacity of future 
generations. The complex, multistressor nature of these risks requires a regulatory 
approach that examines cumulative exposure as a method for setting priorities and 
evaluating the effectiveness of regulatory frameworks.153 
 
                                               
is more likely to have male offspring.). 
147 See Manzetti et al., supra note 145, at 713. 
148 Catherine A. O’Neill, Mercury, Risk & Justice, 34 ENVTL. L. REP. 11070 (Oct. 2004) 
(discussing failed regulatory response to mercury emissions and subsequent attempts to deal 
with the problem on the back end through fish consumption advisories).  
149 See Manzetti et al., supra note 145, at 718. 
150 Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Factsheet: Bisphenol A (Dec. 23, 2016), 
https://www.cdc.gov/biomonitoring/bisphenola_factsheet.html [https://perma.cc/66 
49-4P96]. 
151 See Manzetti et al., supra note 145, at 718 (“In humans, estrogen analogues have 
been linked to contributing to earlier sexual maturation in girls and abnormal genital 
development in boys.”). James A. Rogers et al., Review: Endocrine Disrupting Chemicals 
and Immune Responses: A Focus on Bisphenol-A and Its Potential Mechanisms, 53 
MOLECULAR IMMUNOLOGY 421 (2013). See generally Caitlin M. Jandegian et al., 
Developmental Exposure to Bisphenol A (BPA) Alters Sexual Differentiation in Painted 
Turtles (Chrysemys Picta), 216 GEN. & COMP. ENDOCRINOLOGY 77 (2015) (demonstrating 
that BPA exposure disrupts sexual development). 
152 Marisa M. Fisher and Erica A. Eugster, What Is in Our Environment that Effects 
Puberty?, 44 REPROD. TOXICOLOGY 7 (Apr. 2014), https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/ 
articles/PMC4096833/pdf/nihms598765.pdf [https://perma.cc/U39B-D39M].  
153 Knudsen, supra note 144, at 2331. 
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3.  Interconnected Water Systems 
 
Even within singular systems—like water—there can be unintended 
consequences when too narrow a view is taken on a regulatory issue. For example, 
though groundwater appropriations are often treated independently from surface 
water appropriations, groundwater pumping can impact surface water availability.154 
One examination of the perils of groundwater pumping took note that “[f]rom 
Tucson to Tampa Bay, from California’s Central Valley to Down East Maine, rivers 
and lakes have disappeared, and fresh water is becoming scarce.”155 This 
“overdrafting” of groundwater can result in saltwater intrusion into fresh water 
supplies in coastal areas; it can also cause land to subside, which damages home and 
commercial structures.156 In Pasco Country, north of Tampa Bay, the damage caused 
by land subsidence has resulted in “lawsuits, insurance claims, and considerable ill 
will.”157 
In Whatcom County, Washington, controversy and litigation erupted when the 
County’s practice of allowing unpermitted and largely undocumented wells for the 
use of groundwater began to negatively impact the flow of surface water.158 The 
dispute eventually made its way to the Washington Supreme Court where the County 
was held accountable for protecting the availability of water resources in making 
permitting decisions.159 Because the Court took notice of the interconnected nature 
of the groundwater permitting and the surface water availability, the Court held that 
the County should have considered impacts of groundwater permitting on surface 
water resources.160 The decision turned in part on the County’s particular 
responsibilities under the State’s Growth Management Act to protect water 
resources.161 
 
                                               
154 For a stunning graphical depiction of the complex network of rivers and streams in 
the contiguous United States, see this river basin map: http://www.dailymail.co.uk/science 
tech/article-3860062/The-veins-America-Stunning-map-shows-river-basin-US.html#ixzz4 
OOtv1TRU [https://perma.cc/R5YS-QN7G]. This map is a visual reminder that large regions 
of our country are hydrologically connected, which of course means actions in one place 
have consequences in another. 
155 Robert Glennon, The Perils of Groundwater Pumping, 19 ISSUES IN SCI. AND TECH. 
1, 1 (2002), http://issues.org/19-1/glennon/ [https://perma.cc/3MPU-SRR7]. 
156 Id. at 3. 
157 Id.  
158 Whatcom Cty. v. Hirst, 381 P.3d 1, 4 (Wash. 2016). 
159 Id. at 8–21. 
160 Id. at 18. See also Postema v. Pollution Control Hearings Bd., 11 P.3d 726, 734–35 
(Wash. 2000) (holding that before authorizing groundwater withdrawals the Department of 
Ecology “must consider the interrelationship of the groundwater with surface waters, and 
must determine whether surface water rights would be impaired or affected by groundwater 
withdrawals.”).  
161 Hirst, 381 P.3d at 12 (“When read as a whole, the GMA places the burden on 
counties to protect groundwater resources, and requires counties to assure that water is both 
factually and legally available before issuing building permits.”).  
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4.  Introduced Species 
 
For an example of how the disruption of natural systems can result in economic 
damage, consider that the introduction and spread of the zebra mussel are estimated 
to cost the American economy more than $1 billion dollars annually.162 These pesky 
mollusks, which are endemic to the drainage basins of Eastern Europe and Western 
Asia, were inadvertently introduced to U.S. waters through the discharge of ship 
ballast water into freshwater bodies by the shipping industry.163 Zebra mussels were 
first recorded in Lake St. Clair in 1988.164 Since then, they have spread through the 
Great Lakes and directly impacted the chemical and biological composition of the 
water they inhabit.165 They have disrupted food webs and adversely impacted water 
clarity and quality by changing nitrogen and phosphorous concentrations.166 They 
have been linked to the decline in endemic shellfish and pelagic fish, negatively 
impacted municipal drinking water, and disrupted hydroelectric projects.167 And in 
doing so, they serve as a potent reminder of how interconnectivity allows something 
as seemingly benign as a mollusk to wreak havoc.  
Together, these examples provide lessons, often recounted and often forgotten, 
of the complex and dynamic living systems of which humans are an integral part. 
To the extent that environmental laws aim to protect these living systems, the 
interconnectivity is a humbling reminder that pollutants, nor risk, nor proposed land 
use projects can be viewed in isolation if the goal is a healthy ambient environment.  
 
B.  Cumulative Impacts as a Generalizable Concern in Environmental Law 
 
While science describes, it does not prescribe.168 While science illuminates the 
interconnectedness nature of human relationships to ecosystems, it does not make 
morally bound choices like whether certain species are worth saving from extinction, 
whether Americans should expect clean drinking water to flow from their taps, or 
whether children and grandchildren should inherit a stable climate system. These 
choices require understanding the future consequences of present action; they 
require governing bodies to decide what limits to place on individual choice such 
                                               
162 Doug Jensen, Zebra Mussels Threaten Inland Waters: An Overview, MINN. SEA 
GRANT (Mar. 30, 2017), http://www.seagrant.umn.edu/ais/zebramussels_threaten 
[https://perma.cc/9VJU-KTP7] (noting that zebra mussels are estimated to cost the American 
economy more than $1 billion dollars annually).  
163 Charles R. O’Neill, Jr. et al., The Introduction and Spread of the Zebra Mussel in 
North America, PROC. OF FOURTH INT’L. ZEBRA MUSSEL CONF., MADISON, WIS., 433, 433–
35 (Mar. 1994). 
164 Id. at 433. 
165 David L. Strayer, Twenty Years of Zebra Mussels: Lessons from the Mollusk that 
Made Headlines, 7 FRONT. ECOL. ENV’T 135, 135–36 (Sept. 25, 2008).  
166 Id. at 136. 
167 Id. at 138. 
168 Eric T. Freyfogle & Julianne L. Newton, Essay, Putting Science in Its Place, 16 
CONSERVATION BIOLOGY 863, 864–65 (2002). 
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that the group can thrive in a healthful environment. Those choices, left to 
lawmakers, involve tradeoffs and are not always easy or obvious. Nonetheless, the 
basic goal is simple: to restrain what might be individually benign actions in order 
to prevent them from collectively destructive consequences.  
Indeed, from Garrett Hardin’s Tragedy of the Commons to Aldo Leopold’s call 
for a land ethic, the consequences of collective actions have long driven the need for 
a regulatory and cultural response to environmental problems. Not surprisingly, 
while many of the major environmental laws regulate individual pollutants, 
individual discharges, or individual species, the ultimate goal is a healthy ambient 
environment. That is, the goal is to create a healthful environment by addressing 
cumulative impacts of individual actions. By looking at the pattern of goals and 
mandates within the major body of federal environmental law, one can begin to 
appreciate how cumulative impacts lie at the heart of the problems that Congress has 
set out to solve.  
 
1.  Pattern of Goals, Purpose Statements and Research Directives 
 
To begin, consider that the core goals, purpose statements, or research 
directives of the major federal environmental statutes speak to the consequences of 
collective action through time and space. The Clean Water Act, for instance, begins 
by announcing its objective to “restore and maintain the chemical, physical, and 
biological integrity of the Nation’s waters.”169 Congress then declares the national 
goal of making waters fishable and swimmable by 1983.170 Whatever the 
mechanisms used by the Act to control individual sources of pollution, whatever the 
historical debate over the effectiveness of water quality standards or effluent 
limitations,171 protecting ambient water quality is the undisputable aim of the Clean 
Water Act.172  
The Clean Air Act starts off a bit more broadly, calling for a regulatory program 
that protects the public health and welfare.173 Through the details of the Act, 
                                               
169 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a) (2017). 
170 Id. § 1251(a)(2). 
171 WILLIAM H. RODGERS, JR. & ELIZABETH BURLESON, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW § 4:1 
(2d ed. 2016). 
172 See Robert W. Adler, Integrated Approaches to Water Pollution: Lessons from the 
Clean Air Act, 23 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 203, 251 (1999) [hereinafter Adler, Integrated 
Approaches] (noting that the water quality standards of the Clean Water Act, like the national 
ambient air quality standards of the Clean Air Act, are “designed to establish goals for 
ambient environmental quality and to address cumulative pollution from multiple and 
diverse sources.”). See also Robert W. Adler, The Decline and (Possible) Renewal of 
Aspiration in the Clean Water Act, 88 WASH. L. REV. 759, 763 (2013) [hereinafter Adler, 
Decline and Renewal]. (“Congress made clear in the legislative history of the 1972 
amendments . . . that ‘chemical, physical, and biological integrity’ means something 
approximating natural aquatic ecosystem structure and function.”).  
173 42 U.S.C. § 7401(b)(1) (2017) (declaring one purposes of the Act “to protect and 
enhance the quality of the Nation’s air resources so as to promote the public health and 
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however, it becomes clearer that Congress was particularly mindful of how 
cumulative impacts lie at the heart of public health. For instance, consider that 
Section 103(d) of the Act directs the EPA to research both short and long term 
effects of air pollutants on human health.174 In doing so, the EPA is told that risks 
from both individual air pollutants and combined exposures are relevant.175 
Section 103(e), which addresses ecosystem research, expresses similar interest in 
long term ecosystem damage from air pollutants and directs the EPA to develop a 
research program that quantifies exposure to and effects of “multiple environmental 
stresses.”176 
Even when Congress adopted the Toxic Substances Control Act (“TSCA”) in 
1976177—the very same statute that would become known as one of the most broken 
environmental statutes of the 1970s era178—Congress understood that cumulative 
impacts lie at the heart of the public health risks from chemicals proliferation.179 The 
Conference Report supporting the passage of TSCA expressly acknowledges that 
“[o]ftentimes an unreasonable risk will be presented because of the interrelationship 
or cumulative impact of a number of different substances or mixtures. The conferees 
intend that the Administrator have authority to protect health and the environment 
in such situations.”180 Similarly, the House Report cautions that “[b]ecause of the 
multiple avenues by which humans and the environment are exposed to a substance 
or mixture and because substances and mixtures do not occur in the environment in 
isolation, risks may result from complex interactions or because of cumulative 
effects.”181  
Within natural resource statutes, congressional concern for cumulative impacts 
is often manifested most directly in mandates aimed at balancing resource use 
between generations. For example, in the National Forest Management Act 
(“NFMA”),182 Congress declares that:  
 
                                               
welfare and the productive capacity of its population”). Public health and welfare are 
collective concepts in their own right. See Ronald Bayer, The Continuing Tensions Between 
Individual Rights and Public Health, 8 EMBO REPORTS 1099, 1102 (2007) (“Across the 
spectrum of threats to the public health—from infectious diseases to chronic disorders—are 
inherent tensions between the good of the collective and the individual.”).  
174 42 U.S.C. § 7403(d)(1) (2017).  
175 Id. § 7403(d)(2). 
176 Id. § 7403(e)(3).  
177 15 U.S.C. §§ 2601–2697 (2016).  
178 For a sampling of the critiques leveled against TSCA, see Tracy Bach, Better Living 
Through Chemicals (Regulation): The Chemical Safety Improvement Act of 2013 Through 
an Environmental Public Health Law Lens, 15 VT. J. ENVTL. L. 490, 495–506 (2014) 
(discussing TSCA’s “poor track record”); Noah M. Sachs, Jumping the Pond: Transnational 
Law and the Future of Chemical Regulation, 62 VAND. L. REV. 1817, 1825–31 (2009) 
(discussing “TSCA’s troubles”).  
179 Knudsen, supra note 144, at 2315 & n.8.  
180 H.R. REP. NO. 94-1679, at 61 (1976) (Conf. Rep.).  
181 H.R. REP. NO. 94-1341, at 33 (1976). 
182 16 U.S.C. §§ 1600–1687 (2017). 
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the Forest Service, by virtue of its statutory authority for management of 
the National Forest System, . . . has both a responsibility and an 
opportunity to be a leader in assuring that the Nation maintains a natural 
resource conservation posture that will meet the requirements of our 
people in perpetuity.183  
 
Similarly, NFMA’s close cousin the Federal Land Policy Management Act 
(“FLPMA”), which draws on the notoriously broad concept of multiple use, directs 
the Bureau of Land Management (“BLM”) to utilize resources “in the combination 
that will best meet the present and future needs of the American people.”184 And 
more specifically, in the development of land use plans, the Secretary must “weigh 
long-term benefits to the public against short-term benefits.”185 The National Parks 
Service Organic Act and Wilderness Act—though upholding more focused missions 
of conservation and recreation—have similar visions of preserving beautiful and 
ecologically important spaces for future generations.186  
In carrying out these land use planning missions, natural resource managers 
must necessarily grapple with the cumulative impacts of their land use decisions 
over space and time. And in fact, these land managers are separately under the 
obligation of considering the cumulative impacts of their proposed projects and land 
use plans under the mandates of the National Environmental Policy Act 
(“NEPA”).187 Setting NEPA and its crosscutting obligations aside for a moment, the 
point here is that the prescriptions of the individual organic acts necessarily require 
land managers to adopt a cumulative impacts lens if they are going to properly 
address intergenerational aspects of resource management.  
Read together, the aspirational statements that pulse throughout pollution 
control and natural resource statutes start to resemble a more generalizable ethos, 
one that bears a decidedly public health and intergenerational focus on maintaining 
or creating a healthy ambient environment. In other words, the core goals and 
declarations of Congress support the view that environmental law is a collection of 
efforts aimed toward a common goal of addressing cumulative impacts over time 
and space. Indeed, unlike cost, cumulative impacts are core to the mission of 
adopting these statutes in the first place. In other words, cost may be a second order 
consideration that is relevant to the regulatory choices, but cumulative impacts are 
first order considerations that drive the regulatory mission itself.  
                                               
183 Id. § 1600(6) (emphasis added) (setting forth the responsibilities of the U.S. Forest 
Service).  
184 43 U.S.C. § 1702(c) (2017) (emphasis added) (defining the term “multiple use”).  
185 Id. § 1712(c)(7) (emphasis added) (setting out criteria for developing land use plans).  
186 National Park Service Organic Act, 54 U.S.C. § 100101(a) (2014) (setting out the 
purpose of national parks for the use of the people in a manner that will “leave them 
unimpaired for the enjoyment of future generations”); Wilderness Act of 1964, 16 U.S.C. § 
1131(a) (2017) (stating that the wilderness areas “shall be administered for the use and 
enjoyment of the American people in such manner as will leave them unimpaired for future 
use and enjoyment as wilderness . . . .”). 
187 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321–4370(h) (2017). See also discussion infra Section II.B.3. 
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2.  Patterns of Statutory Mandates and Structures 
 
While some would argue that broad statutory aspirations are of limited utility 
and one ought to be careful to read too much into them, the seriousness with which 
these aspirations ought to be treated is amplified considering that the major 
environmental laws also contain mandates and programs to ensure that the ambient 
environment is protected. Professor and leading environmental law scholar Robert 
Adler has made a similar observation with respect to the Clean Water Act. He argued 
that the aspirational goals of the Clean Water Act merit particular weight in the 
implementation of the Act because elsewhere in the Act, Congress matched 
aspiration goals with specific mandates.188  
Similarly, for cumulative impacts, Congress buttressed aspirational goals and 
research agendas with implementing mandates. In doing so, Congress demonstrated 
a commitment to addressing the fundamental problem of cumulative impacts on 
ambient environmental and public health.189 In other places, Congress was less 
explicit, though the necessity of considering cumulative impacts to fulfill the 
underlying goals of a particular statute is nonetheless apparent.190  
The Clean Water Act, for example, does more than require individual point 
sources to obtain individual discharge permits. Because the Act’s ultimate goal is a 
nation of rivers and lakes clean enough to swim in, the Act directly addresses 
ambient water quality through several provisions. First, retaining the foundations of 
water quality statutes that came before. The Clean Water Act requires states to set 
ambient water quality standards for every water body within the state.191 Next, in 
writing individual discharge permits, regulators are supposed to ensure that the terms 
of the permits will not cause receiving waters to exceed those ambient water quality 
standards.192  
                                               
188 Adler, Decline and Renewal, supra note 172, at 771–72.  
189 See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. §§ 7408–7410 (2017) (explaining that the Clean Air Act sets 
national ambient air quality standards (NAAQS) for six criteria pollutants and requires states 
to adopt implementation plans that ensure the aggregate air emissions in that state will not 
exceed the ambient standards); 33 U.S.C. § 1313(d)(1) (2017) (explaining that the Clean 
Water Act requires states to develop Total Maximum Daily Loads (TMDLs) for all water 
bodies that fail to meet ambient water quality standards); 40 C.F.R. § 1508.7 (2017) 
(explaining that the National Environmental Policy Act requires all federal agencies to 
consider cumulative impacts of their proposed actions by accounting for the combined 
impacts of past, present, and future projects on a particular resource).  
190 TSCA and FIFRA—the major federal chemical and pesticide statutes—are good 
examples. See generally Knudsen, supra note 144 (discussing the policy implications of 
chemical proliferation).  
191 33 U.S.C. §§ 1311(b)(1)(C), 1313 (2017); PUD No. 1 of Jefferson Cty. v. 
Washington Dep't of Ecology, 511 U.S. 700, 704, 114 S. Ct. 1900, 1905 (1994) (“Section 
303 of the Act also requires each State, subject to federal approval, to institute 
comprehensive water quality standards establishing water quality goals for all intrastate 
waters.”). 
192 See 33 U.S.C. § 1311(b)(1)(C) (2017); 40 C.F.R. § 122.44(d) (2017). See also 
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But because best laid intentions are not always enough, and because individual 
waters can receive pollutant from both permitted point sources (which are required 
to get a permit) and nonpoint sources (that are not required to get a permit), Congress 
added yet another mechanism by which to address ambient water quality—the Total 
Maximum Daily Load, or TMDL program.193 Under the program, namely Section 
303(d), states are required to create a list of waters that fail to meet water quality 
standards.194 The state must then develop what is called a TMDL for these impaired 
waters by determining how much of a given pollutant can enter the receiving water 
and still meet the water quality standard.195 The TMDL process develops an 
accounting of all the sources—point and nonpoint—that contribute to the water’s 
pollutant load.196 Finally, once the regulators have figured how much pollutant a 
given body of water can receive and how much it actually receives, the regulators 
allocate a portion of the total load to the identified sources, with a margin of safety.197  
These structural designs have played out differently in practice—namely, 
cumulative impacts continue to confound the quest for clean waters.198 Still, there is 
                                               
Arkansas v. Oklahoma, 503 U.S. 91, 101 (1992) (Water quality standards “supplement 
effluent limitations ‘so that numerous point sources, despite individual compliance with 
effluent limitations, may be further regulated to prevent water quality from falling below 
acceptable levels.’” (quoting EPA v. California ex rel. State Water Resources Control Bd., 
426 U.S. 200, 205, n. 12 (1976))). 
193 WILLIAM H. RODGERS, JR. & ELIZABETH BURLESON, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW § 4:18 
(Dec. 2017 Update) (“In one respect, the pollution load assignment provisions of 
Section 303(d) are a monument to the ambitions of rational decisionmaking. . . . In another 
respect Section 303(d) represents an acutely political judgment keeping the banner of water 
quality in evidence despite the temporary ascendancy of technology-based controls. It was 
included in the Act at the insistence of the House conferees and reflects the historical water 
quality standards assumption that assimilation of wastes is a fit and proper function of a 
watercourse. In a sense, Section 303(d) represents contingent planning by the Congress for 
the day when the no-discharge objective is abandoned in favor of basin level allocations of 
assimilative capacity.”).  
194 33 U.S.C. § 1313(d)(1)(A) (2017). For an in depth discussion of TMDLs, see 
generally OLIVER A. HOUCK, THE CLEAN WATER ACT TMDL PROGRAM: LAW, POLICY, AND 
IMPLEMENTATION (2d. ed. 2002).  
195 33 U.S.C. § 1313(d)(1)(C) (2017). 
196 For a brief primer on TMDL development, see Program Overview: Total Maximum 
Daily Loads (TDMLS), EPA (Mar. 2, 2017), https://www.epa.gov/tmdl/program-overview-
total-maximum-daily-loads-tmdl [https://perma.cc/P784-2XHE]. Cf. Pronsolino v. Nastri, 
291 F.3d 1123 (9th Cir. 2002) (upholding EPA’s authority to establish a TMDL even where 
a river is impaired only by nonpoint sources of pollution). 
197 33 U.S.C. § 1313(d)(1)(C) (2017); see also Program Overview: Total Maximum 
Daily Loads (TDMLS), EPA (Mar. 2, 2017), https://www.epa.gov/tmdl/program-overview-
total-maximum-daily-loads-tmdl [https://perma.cc/P784-2XHE]. 
198 Adler, Integrated Approaches, supra note 172, at 203 (“Significant water pollution 
problems remain throughout the United States a quarter-century after enactment of the 
Nation’s major water pollution-fighting statute, the Clean Water Act . . . . These problems 
stem in large part from inadequate programs to address cumulative harm to aquatic 
ecosystems from disparate and diffuse pollution sources.”). 
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no doubt that the Clean Water Act’s ambient water quality standards and TMDL 
program were designed to address cumulative impacts in theory. Because ambient 
water quality is undoubtedly relevant to the success story of the Clean Water Act, 
cumulative impacts must likewise be relevant to the permitting decisions and other 
policy choices made under the Act.  
Like the Clean Water Act, the Clean Air Act is designed to regulate individual 
sources of pollution in service of protecting the ambient air quality. To that end, at 
the structural heart of the Clean Air Act lies the National Ambient Air Quality 
Standards (“NAAQS”).199 The basic idea is this: for the most common pollutants, 
the federal government will set ambient air quality standards adequate to protect 
public health and then states will decide how to control local pollution sources and 
employ control strategies to meet those standards.200 The NAAQS (and any given 
region’s ability to meet those standards) impacts the stringency of pollution control 
technology that will be imposed on existing and new major stationary sources.201 In 
this way, controlling individual sources of air emissions is in service of the 
overarching goal of meeting ambient air quality standards and protecting public 
health.  
Other provisions similarly underscore Congress’s mindfulness of the 
interconnectivity of individual actions. The Clean Air Act’s good neighbor 
provision, for instance, requires states to prevent emissions that would “contribute 
significantly to nonattainment in, or interfere with maintenance by, any other state 
with respect to any such national primary or secondary ambient air quality 
standard.”202 At least for individual criteria pollutants, the Clean Air Act requires 
states to examine a more complex set of combined exposures in order to avoid 
downwind disturbances. This same rationale—that emissions in one area can 
adversely impact downwind localities and should therefore be evaluated as part of 
the regulatory decisionmaking process—would also hold true outside of the NAAQs 
context and counsel for the consideration of cumulative impacts in furthering the 
public health mission of the Act.  
While cumulative impacts are made relevant to the Clean Air Act and Clean 
Water Act through their desire to protect the ambient environment and public health, 
cumulative impacts are made relevant to toxic control statutes through their desire 
to protect human health and the environment from “unreasonable risk.”203 To that 
                                               
199 42 U.S.C. § 7409 (2017) (requiring the EPA to protect public health through ambient 
air quality standards); see also DAVID R. WOOLEY & ELIZABETH M. MORSS, CLEAN AIR ACT 
HANDBOOK § 1:2 (25th ed. 2015) (“Although somewhat eclipsed by newer pollutant or 
source-specific requirements such as the Title IV acid rain program, the NAAQS remain the 
cornerstone of the CAA.”).  
200 WOOLEY & MORSS, supra note 199, at §§ 1:29, 1:30. 
201 Id. at § 4:6.  
202 42 U.S.C. § 7410(a)(2)(D)(i)(I) (2017) (“good neighbor” provision); see also Daniel 
A. Farber, Unpacking EME Homer: Cost, Proportionality, and Emissions Reductions, 4 
MICH. J. ENVTL. & ADMIN. L. 213, 215 (2015) (discussing the complexities of deciding how 
to allocate pollution control responsibilities among states given the mobility of air).  
203 See Toxic Substances Control Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2604(f) (2016); Chemical Safety 
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end, when Congress adopted TSCA in 1976, it gave the EPA authority to regulate 
chemical substances and mixtures that posed an “unreasonable risk” to public health 
and environment.204 In defining “environment,” Congress expressly made 
interrelationships between resources relevant to the risk calculus.205 The statutory 
text, the rich legislative history recounting congressional concerns about cumulative 
exposure,206 and the extensive risk science literature identifying cumulative 
exposures as key to understanding public health risks posed by chemicals 
proliferation together suggest that cumulative exposures are centrally relevant to the 
risk analysis.207  
In 2016, in recognition of the many failings of TSCA to actually protect public 
health from chemicals regulation, Congress modernized TSCA by adopting the 
Frank R. Lautenberg Chemical Safety for the 21st Century Cures Act (“new Act” or 
“Chemical Safety Act”).208 In doing so, Congress shifted the burden of proving 
chemical safety from the EPA to the chemical industry and adopted other structural 
changes meant to strengthen the uniformity and public health protections of the 
Act.209 Congress retained the “unreasonable risk” threshold to regulation and 
retained the definition of environment to include interrelationships.210 The new Act 
also gives the EPA authority to create testing protocols and methodologies to 
develop information regarding “cumulative or synergistic effects, and any other 
effect which may present an unreasonable risk of injury to health or the 
environment.”211 From a textual standpoint, then, cumulative impacts remain 
                                               
Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2605(a) (2016); Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act 7 
U.S.C. § 136(z)(bb) (2017).  
204 Toxic Substances Control Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2604(f) (2012). 
205 15 U.S.C. § 2602(6) (2016) (defining environment).  
206 See Knudsen, supra note 144 and accompanying text.  
207 See Knudsen, supra note 144, at 2322–31 (discussing the risk science literature).  
208 15 U.S.C. §§ 2601–2697 (2016); see also Knudsen, supra note 144, at 2386–89 
(discussing the room for regulating cumulative risk under the recent TSCA amendments).  
209 See 15 U.S.C. § 2604(g) (2016) (“If the Administrator finds in accordance with 
subsection (a)(3)(C) that a chemical substance or significant new use is not likely to present 
an unreasonable risk of injury to health or the environment, then . . . the submitter of the 
notice may commence manufacture of the chemical substance or manufacture or processing 
for the significant new use.”); see also 15 U.S.C. § 2601(b)(1) (2016) (stating it is the policy 
of the United States that “adequate information should be developed with respect to the effect 
of chemical substances and mixtures on health and the environment and that the development 
of such information should be the responsibility of those who manufacture and those who 
process such chemical substances and mixtures.”).  
210 15 U.S.C. § 2605(a) (2016) (requiring the EPA to regulate any chemical that 
“presents an unreasonable risk of injury to health or the environment”); 15 U.S.C. § 2602(6) 
(2016) (defining “environment” to mean “water, air, and land and the interrelationship which 
exists among and between water, air, and land and all living things.”).  
211 15 U.S.C. § 2603(b)(2)(A) (2016) (“The health and environmental effects for which 
protocols and methodologies for the development of information may be prescribed include 
carcinogenesis, mutagenesis, teratogenesis, behavioral disorders, cumulative or synergistic 
effects, and any other effect which may present an unreasonable risk of injury to health or 
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relevant to the risk calculus under the new Act, perhaps even more expressly so. And 
from the standpoint of scientific understanding and pragmatism, the relevance 
cumulative risk to public health protection is also unchanged.212  
Similar to the Chemical Safety Act, the Federal Insecticide Fungicide and 
Rodenticide Act (“FIFRA”) authorizes the EPA to limit the distribution, sale or use 
of a pesticide “to prevent unreasonable adverse effects on the environment.”213 And 
like the Chemical Safety Act, FIFRA broadly defines “environment” to mean 
“water, air, land, and all plants and man and other animals living therein, and the 
interrelationships which exist among these.”214 Nothing in the language of FIFRA 
suggests that cumulative exposures fall outside the safety thresholds. In fact, 
Congress amended FIFRA in 1996 to require the EPA to protect public health based 
on combined impacts from pesticides in some circumstances.215 In particular, FIFRA 
was amended to take aggregate exposures to pesticides into account when setting 
pesticide residue limits on food.216 These amendments, also known as the Food 
Quality Protection Act, responded to warnings from the National Academy of 
Sciences on the importance of assessing collective impacts from pesticides.217 While 
there are still substantial gaps to be filled in this area,218 the Food Quality Protection 
Act is an example of how, even in areas where industry captured the regulatory 
frameworks early on, the science is compelling a shift in statutory mandates to more 
directly address the cumulative risk presented by environmental issues.219  
In natural resource statutes, which are more focused on the land use planning 
and conservation of particular areas for future generations, evaluating cumulative 
impacts is an essential feature to the balancing short term desires with long term 
obligations. For example, in determining the appropriate level of grazing on public 
lands, BLM managers need to consider how drought and other changing land 
conditions from climate change will impact the ability of the range to support 
cattle.220 Public land managers are similarly obliged to consider cumulative impacts 
                                               
the environment.”). 
212 See generally Knudsen, supra note 144 (discussing chemical proliferation).  
213 7 U.S.C. § 136a(a) (2017). 
214 7 U.S.C. § 136(j) (1996). 
215 Food Quality Protection Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104–170, 110 Stat. 1489 (codified 
as amended at 21 U.S.C. § 346(a) (2017)). For a discussion of the history and limitations of 
these amendments, see Knudsen, supra note 144, at 2375–82. 
216 21 U.S.C. § 346(a) (2017). 
217 See Knudsen, supra note 144, at 2378.  
218 For a critique of the implementations gaps that exist under FIFRA despite the FQPA, 
see Thomas O. McGarity, Politics by Other Means: Law, Science, and Policy in EPA’s 
Implementation of the Food Quality Protection Act, 53 ADMIN. L. REV. 103, 109–10 (2001); 
see also Knudsen, supra note 144, at 2380–82.  
219 See Knudsen, supra note 144, at 2375–82. 
220 Robert L. Beschta et al., Adapting to Climate Change on Western Public Lands: 
Addressing the Ecological Effects of Domestic, Wild, and Feral Ungulates, 51 ENVTL. 
MGMT. 474, 475 (2012) (“Although federal land managers have recently begun considering 
how to adapt to and mitigate potential climate-related impacts, they have not addressed the 
combined effects of climate change and ungulates (hooved mammals) on ecosystems.”). Cf. 
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when considering whether to move ahead with various extractive or energy 
development projects.221 When no such analysis is forthcoming, courts have held 
agency decisions arbitrary and capricious.222 
In some ways, it might seem overly simplistic to suggest that environmental 
laws can be distilled to a common core of defining principles. After all, these statutes 
are complex and employ a wide range of tools and mandates to serve their designs. 
But the argument here is not that these laws have a singular purpose. In fact, many 
do not. Some, like FLPMA, are decidedly broad in their multiple use goals223 and 
others, like FIFRA, have been roundly criticized as bearing too heavy of an industry 
focus.224 The Chemical Safety Act, despite being updated to more adequately 
address public health, continues to wear economic considerations on its sleeve.225 
                                               
Tony Svejcar et al., Western Land Managers will Need all Available Tools for Adapting to 
Climate Change, Including Grazing: A Critique of Beschta et al., 53 ENVTL. MGMT. 1035, 
1036 (2014) (“Broad scale reduction of domestic and wild herbivores to help native plant 
communities cope with climate change will be unnecessary because over the past 20–50 
years land managers have actively sought to bring populations of native and domestic 
herbivores in balance with the potential of vegetation and soils.”).  
221 See, e.g., S. Utah Wilderness All. v. Norton, 326 F. Supp. 2d 102, 119–20 (D.D.C. 
2004) (concluding that the BLM properly elected to conduct an EA instead of an EIS because 
“[t]he determination of whether BLM should have prepared an EIS turns largely on whether 
the EA was adequately conducted and properly took cumulative impacts into account” and 
the BLM had dedicated an entire chapter in the EA to cumulative impacts analysis); Native 
Vill. of Point Hope v. Salazar, 730 F. Supp. 2d 1009, 1012 (D. Alaska 2010) (deferring to 
the agency’s informed discretion in approving an oil and gas lease when agency devoted 76 
pages of its EIS to a cumulative impacts assessment). See also Arnold W. Reitze, Jr., The 
Role of NPEA in Fossil Fuel Resource Development and Use in the Western United States, 
39 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 283, 311–63 (2012) (assembling cases involving cumulative 
impacts challenges to energy development projects on public lands).  
222 See Sierra Club v. Mainella, 459 F. Supp. 2d 76, 107–08 (D.D.C. 2006) (holding the 
National Park Service’s decision to allow oil and gas drilling operations on NPS lands was 
arbitrary and capricious because the Service had failed to consider the cumulative impacts 
of the drilling operations); Wyo. Outdoor Council v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 351 F. 
Supp. 2d 1232, 1237 (D. Wyo. 2005) (vacating permit allowing the release of coalbed 
methane water into above ground reservoirs because the Army Corps had failed to consider 
cumulative impacts); Te-Moak Tribe v. U.S. Dep’t of the Interior, 608 F.3d 592, 601 (9th 
Cir. 2010) (concluding that the BLM’s cumulative impact analysis of proposed gold mining 
operations on public lands was insufficient). 
223 43 U.S.C. § 1701(a)(7) (2017) (declaring that “management be on the basis of 
multiple use”); 43 U.S.C. § 1702(c) (2017) (defining the term “multiple use”). 
224 See Pamela A. Finegan, FIFRA Lite: A Regulatory Solution or Part of the Pesticide 
Problem?, 6 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 615 (1989). 
225 15 U.S.C. § 2601(b)(3) (2016) (declaring congressional policy that the “authority 
over chemical substances and mixtures should be exercised in such a manner as not to impede 
unduly or create unnecessary economic barriers to technological innovation while fulfilling 
the primary purpose of this chapter to assure that such innovation and commerce in such 
chemical substances and mixtures do not present an unreasonable risk of injury to health or 
the environment.”) (emphasis added).  
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Indeed, for many of these statutes, at least portions of their implementation are 
dependent on cost considerations or bounded by technological feasibility.226  
Again, the suggestion here is decidedly not that environmental laws are simple 
or singular in their aims. Quite the opposite is true. At the same time, however, 
threading throughout the complexity is a deceptively simple and driving purpose: 
the statutes that make up the body of environmental law are fundamentally meant to 
protect human and ecological health from the destructive consequences of collective 
action. To evaluate whether regulatory decisions in furtherance of these statutes has 
merit, therefore, one would quite naturally expect some consideration of how the 
regulatory decision serves the end goals. That is, one would expect some 
consideration of cumulative impacts and whether the regulatory decision decreases 
or increases the overall cumulative burden that the statute is ultimately designed to 
reduce.  
 
3.  NEPA as a Crosscutting Directive 
 
Perhaps nowhere is the generalizable relevance of cumulative impacts to 
environmental law more apparent than in NEPA.227 That crosscutting statute 
requires all federal agencies to consider the environmental impacts of their proposed 
actions.228 In particular, NEPA’s implementing regulations require all federal 
agencies to consider cumulative impacts of proposed actions.229 
By way of background, NEPA reflects a congressional commitment to injecting 
an environmental consciousness into a large range of government decisions. Indeed, 
though the statute operates procedurally, the driving congressional goals were 
certainly substantive.230 In the oft forgotten Section 101 of NEPA, Congress declares 
that “it is the continuing responsibility of the Federal Government to use all 
practicable means, consistent with other essential considerations of national 
                                               
226 See David M. Driesen, Distributing the Costs of Environmental, Health, and Safety 
Protection: The Feasibility Principle, Cost-Benefit Analysis, and Regulatory Reform, 32 
B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 1, 1 (2005) (discussing the differences between the feasibility 
principle incorporated in environmental laws and the values embodied in cost benefit 
analysis).  
227 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321–4370h (2017).  
228 42 U.S.C. § 4332(C)(i) (2017). 
229 40 C.F.R. § 1508.25(c)(3) (2017) (requiring consideration of cumulative impacts); 
40 C.F.R. § 1508.7 (2017) (defining the term “cumulative impact”). 
230 The Supreme Court in Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens Council, 490 U.S. 332, 
351 (1989), famously stated that “NEPA merely prohibits uninformed—rather than 
unwise—agency action.” Still, given the plain and striking textual commitments to 
substantive goals of reducing environmental degradation, there continues to be scholarly 
discourse on the substantive reach of NEPA. See, e.g., Nicholas C. Yost, NEPA’s Promise–
Partially Fulfilled, 20 ENVTL. L. 533 (1990) (arguing that the Supreme Court got it wrong); 
Philip Weinberg, It’s Time to Put NEPA Back on Course, 3 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 99 (1994) 
(discussing NEPA’s explicit substantive mandate); Jamison E. Colburn, The Risk in 
Discretion: Substantive NEPA’s Significance, 41 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 1, 3 nn.7–8 (2016) 
(assembling the literature).  
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policy . . . to fulfill the responsibilities of each generation as trustee of the 
environment for succeeding generations” and to “attain the widest range of 
beneficial uses of the environment without degradation, risk to health or safety, or 
other undesirable and unintended consequences.”231 To attain the lofty goal of 
“encourag[ing] productive and enjoyable harmony between man and his 
environment,” Congress established the Council on Environmental Quality (“CEQ”) 
to facilitate the implementation of NEPA.232  
Relevant to the consideration of cumulative impacts as part the pattern and 
practice of agencies, the CEQ’s implementing of regulations has required agencies 
to consider the direct, indirect, and cumulative impacts of their proposed actions 
since 1978.233 Cumulative impacts are defined by the regulations as  
 
the impact on the environment which results from the incremental impact 
of the action when added to other past, present, and reasonably foreseeable 
future actions regardless of what agency (Federal or non-Federal) or 
person undertakes such other actions. Cumulative impacts can result from 
individually minor but collectively significant actions taking place over a 
period of time.234  
 
While the cumulative impacts requirement does not flow expressly from the 
language of the statute itself, Congress did specifically charge agencies with 
considering “the relationship between local short-term uses of man’s environment 
and the maintenance and enhancement of long-term productivity.”235 Elsewhere, the 
congressional declarations of policy similarly reference intergenerational 
stewardship responsibilities.  
By openly acknowledging the importance of understanding impacts over longer 
time horizons, and through the broad declarations of concern for “the profound 
impact of man’s activity on the interrelations of all components of the natural 
environment,” the text of NEPA implicitly requires agencies to adopt a cumulative 
impacts lens.236 In fact, the CEQ regulations codified federal court decisions that 
drew from the stated mandates of NEPA and similarly concluded that cumulative 
impacts were central to fulfilling NEPA’s mission.237 Professor Courtney Schultz, 
                                               
231 42 U.S.C. § 4331(b) (2017).  
232 42 U.S.C. § 4321 (2017).  
233 See Courtney A. Schultz, History of the Cumulative Effects Analysis Requirement 
Under NEPA and Its Interpretation in U.S. Forest Service Case Law, 27 J. ENVTL. L. & 
LITIG. 125 (2012).  
234 40 C.F.R. § 1508.7 (2017). 
235 42 U.S.C. § 4332(C)(iv) (2017).  
236 42 U.S.C. § 4331(a) (2017). 
237 See, e.g., Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. Callaway, 524 F.2d 79 (2d Cir. 1975); 
Kleppe v. Sierra Club, 427 U.S. 390, 410 (1976) (“[W]hen several proposals for coal-related 
actions that will have cumulative or synergistic environmental impact upon a region are 
pending concurrently before an agency, their environmental consequences must be 
considered together.”). 
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in her deep exploration of cumulative impacts assessments under NEPA, has 
likewise observed that “the cumulative effects requirement represents some of the 
core goals of NEPA: to consider long-term environmental effects, to look beyond 
incremental decision-making, and to consider the effects of the actions of multiple 
actors.”238  
Though cumulative impacts is a long established requirement of NEPA, several 
studies in the 1990s showed that agencies frequently ignored or gave minimal 
attention to cumulative impacts analysis.239 In 1997, to encourage more robust 
cumulative effects analysis under NEPA, the CEQ published a handbook on 
cumulative impacts analysis. Federal agencies refer to this handbook in preparing 
cumulative impacts analyses.240 In the handbook, the CEQ reemphasizes the 
importance of assessing cumulative impacts in regulatory decisions: 
 
Evidence is increasing that the most devastating environmental effects 
may result not from the direct effects of particular actions, but from the 
combination of individually minor effects of multiple actions over 
time . . . . The fact that the human environment continues to change in 
unintended and unwanted ways in spite of improved federal decision-
making . . . is largely attributable to this incremental (cumulative) 
impact.241 
 
Lest one were to question the importance of the CEQ’s statements in this 
regard, consider that Congress created the CEQ to implement NEPA and gave the 
CEQ a seat in the White House.242 This structural design not only validates the 
authority of the CEQ but also underscores Congress’s commitment to creating an 
ethos of environmental review among agencies and regulatory decisions. In fact, the 
creation of CEQ alongside NEPA substantially strengthens the comparison of the 
relevance of cumulative impacts to the relevance of cost in environmental 
regulation. To that end, CEQ is analogous to OIRA. Both ensure a consistent set of 
considerations permeate agency decisions.  
Just as the Court in Michigan took note of the established agency practice of 
considering cost in regulatory decisionmaking, NEPA shows that cumulative 
impacts have long been accepted as relevant to agency decisionmaking. In fact, 
cumulative impacts—in addition to being pragmatically central to the mission of the 
                                               
238 Schultz, supra note 233, at 133. 
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240 Id. at 135.  
241 Id. at 135 (citation omitted). 
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individual environmental statutes—are also independently endorsed by Congress as 
a means of fulfilling the goals of NEPA. 
 
* * * 
 
Whether through major pollution control statutes like the Clean Air Act and 
Clean Water Act, in natural resource statutes like the National Forest Management 
Act, through crosscutting statutes like NEPA, or in ad hoc amendments like the Food 
Quality Protection Act, there is an undeniable pattern within environmental and 
natural resource laws to consider the collective consequences of incremental, 
individual actions. This pattern is not surprising given the scientific consensus that 
interconnectivity is ubiquitous and inherent in the environment.  
Even where Congress is silent as to the relevancy of cumulative impacts, logic 
would dictate that interconnectivity is likely to lie at the heart of the problems law 
seeks to resolve. And logic would further dictate that considering cumulative 
impacts is central to evaluating the effectiveness of environmental regulatory 
decisions. If in some cases this seems too loose a statutory connection, recall that 
Michigan v. EPA identified cost as centrally relevant factor of regulatory 
decisionmaking based largely on pragmatism, patterns of agency practice, and some 
consistency with congressional aims within other provisions of the Clean Air Act. 
Just as the Supreme Court recognized in Michigan v. EPA with respect to cost, there 
is a systemic concern for cumulative impacts that supports elevating it to the stature 
of being a centrally relevant factor in the judicial review framework. If that is the 
case, we might begin to appreciate that assessing cumulative risk is not only 
permissible under the regulatory frameworks but an indispensable part of rational 
decisionmaking. 
 
PART III:  WHAT GOOD MIGHT IT DO 
 
Even if one accepts the argument that addressing cumulative impacts is 
centrally relevant to environmental law, one might still ask why recognizing 
cumulative impacts in this way is necessary if the statutory goals and mandates 
supporting the consideration of cumulative impacts are so ubiquitous. More 
specifically, one might wonder why, in the face of NEPA’s crosscutting mandates, 
it would be productive to tie cumulative impacts directly to the legal frameworks 
governing judicial review. There are at least three reasons why recognizing 
cumulative impacts as a centrally relevant factor would be a step forward in 
environmental decisionmaking.  
First, the judicial review framework supplied by the APA provides the broadest, 
most systematic point of entry into the regulatory decisionmaking process. Tying 
the consideration of cumulative impacts directly to arbitrary and capricious review 
ensures that agencies engage in rational decisionmaking even when NEPA does not 
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apply. To be sure, NEPA, though broad, contains certain carve outs. It does not, for 
example, apply to the issuance of permits under the Clean Air Act.243  
Second, NEPA is only procedural in nature. NEPA simply requires agencies to 
consider cumulative impacts and does not constrain the agency’s substantive 
decision.244 By tying cumulative impacts to the arbitrary and capricious framework, 
agencies would be obligated to justify their decisions in light of cumulative impacts. 
While arbitrariness review is still quite deferential, it allows courts to take a hard 
look at the substantive reasoning of the underlying decision if so inclined.245 In that 
way, the arbitrary and capricious review is a valuable check on ensuring expert 
agencies do not stray too far beyond congressional commands or common sense. 
Just as considering cost of regulations reflects generalized judgments about the need 
to optimize economic efficiency of regulation, considering cumulative impacts 
allows regulators to measure the success of their efforts against the core mission of 
environmental law to provide a healthy ambient environment. 
Third, perhaps more importantly, recognizing cumulative impacts as a 
“centrally relevant factor” sharpens the focus of regulatory decisions. To that end, 
while many of the environmental laws contain goals or implementing mandates 
aimed at addressing cumulative impacts, issues of ambient pollution are difficult 
and, therefore, not surprisingly many statutes have fallen short of their lofty goals in 
implementation.246 There is work to do and refocusing on the core missions of 
environmental and natural resources law might prove useful. Three brief examples 
help illustrate the point.  
 
A.  Air: Using a Cumulative Impacts Lens to Evaluate Decisions 
 
The NAAQS program, while heralded as a success in terms of the emissions 
reductions it has achieved, is limited. It regulates only six criteria pollutants—carbon 
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monoxide, particulate matter, SOx, NOx, lead, and ozone.247 But there is much to 
do, particularly in the area of toxic air emissions and greenhouse gas emissions.248 
Regulating in these areas, as illustrated by Michigan v. EPA and the challenges to 
the EPA’s Clean Power Plan currently pending before the D.C. Circuit, is fraught 
with controversy.249  
One of the common areas of criticism that the EPA faces as it tries to defend 
these rules, and one area that might benefit from a cumulative impacts lens, is the 
EPA’s reliance on co-benefits in justifying the cost of Clean Air Act regulations.250 
Co-benefits are incidental reductions in emissions as a byproduct of the main 
regulatory goal. For example, in reducing mercury emissions from power plants, the 
control technologies would also reduce particulate matter emissions. In Michigan v. 
EPA, New York University’s Institute for Policy Integrity submitted an amicus brief 
noting that the “EPA—under presidents of both parties and across four decades—
has consistently taken indirect benefits into account when evaluating Clean Air Act 
regulations.”251 Not surprisingly, that practice has been criticized by industry as a 
means of overinflating the benefits of regulation.252  
If one accepts, however, that reducing cumulative impacts is centrally relevant 
to the mission of environmental regulation, the consideration of co-benefits in the 
cost benefit calculus might more easily be accepted as a legitimate and even 
desirable practice. To that end, by recalling that environmental problems are not 
easily conserved in time, space, or between individual pollutants, we might more 
readily accept or even insist upon a cost benefit analysis that reflects such 
complexity.  
In a more straightforward application of a cumulative impacts lens to air 
regulation, one that steers clear of the co-benefits debate, is the simple requirement 
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that regulators consider the combined impacts of issuing multiple air permits in a 
given industrial area.253 For example, the Minnesota Legislature passed a law in 
2008 that required the Minnesota Pollution Control Agency to analyze and consider 
“cumulative levels and effects of past and current environmental pollution,” before 
a permit may be issued for a facility located in a specific area of South 
Minneapolis.254 The legislation came in reaction to a proposed electric generating 
biomass facility in a community already experiencing “disproportionate exposure to 
environmental stressors including air pollutants.”255  
In response to the legislation, the Minnesota Pollution Control Agency 
developed a framework for assessing cumulative risks—the Cumulative Levels & 
Effects Analysis—that drew on many tools and modeling methods already available 
to the agency.256 Ultimately, the permit applicant, with MPCA’s review and 
approval, is responsible for completing five steps for a cumulative levels and effects 
analysis for air permits. The framework was first applied to a permit application in 
2010 for “a facility that includes a spray coating booth, natural gas combustion 
heating, maintenance activities, and an emergency generator.”257 Notably, the 
facility changed the design after the draft permit was issued to incorporate 
geothermal heating in order to reduce “short-term emissions of respiratory 
irritants.”258 It is difficult to ascribe the change to the cumulative impacts framework 
but the change is certainly consistent with the additional attention to the combined 
health impacts on the community.  
Minnesota serves as an example of how cumulative impacts can be integrated 
into the air permitting process, but also as an example of why calling out cumulative 
impacts as centrally relevant is valuable beyond the existing environmental review 
statutes like NEPA. To that end, without the 2008 legislation, Minnesota’s 
environmental review statute already required cumulative impacts analysis259 and 
the Minnesota Supreme Court had already recognized the need for cumulative risk 
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assessment of exposure to air pollution.260 The focused mandate lead to definitive 
analytical response by the Minnesota Pollution Control Agency.  
 
B.  Toxics: Using a Cumulative Impacts Lens to Evaluate Decisions 
 
As another example of where regulation might benefit from a cumulative 
impacts lens, recall that the major federal chemicals and pesticide statutes authorize 
EPA to regulate chemicals or pesticides that present an “unreasonable risk” to public 
health or the environment. While those statutes—the Chemical Safety Act and 
FIFRA—do not speak directly to cumulative risk, it is apparent that risk from 
combined exposures to multiple chemicals or pesticides lies at the heart of the public 
health concerns in this area.261 (Recall the earlier example of endocrine disrupting 
chemicals and their pervasiveness in consumer products and the ambient 
environment.) When those real world concerns are paired, in the case of the 
Chemical Safety Act, with a statute that requires the EPA to “consider all relevant 
factors” in its risk determination,262 it becomes quite obvious that the EPA should 
be assessing risk from combined exposures as part of its risk assessment.263  
Admittedly, cumulative risk assessments are complicated, time consuming, and 
suffer from real informational gaps.264 Still, regulators that embraced a cumulative 
impacts lens would ostensibly be more apt to ask for cumulative risk testing,265 
which in turn would eventually start to fill the knowledge void. Likewise, regulating 
through a cumulative impacts lens could encourage more conservative assumptions 
about risks from chemicals exposure.  
If this sounds too complicated or radical, consider that the California EPA 
already does this as part of the mandates of California’s Proposition 65 legislation. 
To supplement the federal regime, California adopted Proposition 65 to address 
chemicals regulation.266 In addition to imposing a disclosure requirement (discussed 
later), Proposition 65 prohibits businesses from discharging toxic chemicals into 
drinking water supplies.267 Because liability turns on specified risk levels, the statute 
contains a number of provisions addressing how risk from chemicals exposure ought 
to be calculated.268 To account for uncertainty in assessing cumulative risk, for 
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example, Proposition 65 makes conservative assumptions, e.g. setting the exposure 
level for reproductive toxicants at one thousand times the actual exposure level.269 
As Professor Michael Graf explains “[t]hese conservative statutory assumptions 
assure that discharges or exposures are assessed in a preventative manner, in effect 
taking into account—albeit in an approximate fashion—the cumulative effect of the 
different sources of toxic chemicals to which persons will be exposed.”270 
 
C.  Water: Using a Cumulative Impacts Lens to Evaluate Decisions 
 
As a final example of where a cumulative impacts lens can help steer policy 
back to the original goals of environmental law, consider once more the Clean Water 
Act and its quest to address ambient water quality through the TMDL program. In 
particular, recall that the TMDL Program, which is supposed to consider cumulative 
impact and serve as a backstop to impaired waters, has held great promise in theory 
but has achieved little progress in fact.271 Indeed, “[a]s of August 2013, EPA’s 
assessment of national water quality . . . reported that more than half the nation’s 
assessed waters do not meet these standards or their designated uses, such as fishing, 
swimming, or drinking.”272  
Professor Oliver Houck, one of the nation’s leading scholars on TMDLs, has 
referred to the TMDL program as a “stepchild program.”273 As Houck explains, the 
EPA failed to implement TMDLs for two decades after the Clean Water Act was 
passed, focusing instead on NPDES permitting of point sources.274 The end result 
was that nonpoint sources of pollution, arising silviculture and agriculture and 
animal feeding operation and storm water, got out of hand and ate up any progress 
made on the point source front.275 And while litigation has at various times in history 
tried to spur TMDL into action, overall, the lack of accountability underpinning the 
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allocation process has failed to move TMDLs beyond a number crunching 
exercise.276  
These failures beg an important question: how would a cumulative impacts lens 
in judicial review help? After all, the Clean Water Act already sets up a seemingly 
rational approach for integrating the regulation of individual dischargers with the 
maintenance of ambient water quality. Ostensibly, individual discharge permits 
should already consider the effect of the discharge on water quality standards. These 
permits should be written so as not to violate water quality standards. And 
ostensibly, for those waterways where a TMDL exists, there should already be some 
measure as to the amount of loading from points sources that are collectively 
permissible.  
Theory and aspirations aside, whether permit writers and TMDL developers 
actually coordinate is unclear. In June 2015, the EPA Region 9 published a document 
addressing best practices for coordinating individual permits and TMDL limits.277 
While careful to state that the document was not an official EPA policy and did not 
even rise to the level of guidance, the stated reason for the document was the EPA 
Region 9’s belief that “many TMDLs are written in ways that make them difficult 
to implement through permits and, conversely, many NPDES permits contain 
effluent limitations that do not accurately implement the intent of associated 
TMDLs.”278 If this is true, then strengthening the importance of cumulative impacts 
in the judicial review framework could encourage all permit writers to refocus their 
efforts to heed the “best practices” laid out by Region 9, especially when these 
practices are dictated by the underlying statutory structure in any event.  
 
CONCLUSION 
 
Cost does not corner the market on relevance. But when cost is treated as king, 
one could rightfully observe that makers of policy—legislators, lawyers, judges, 
politicians, regulators, scholars—risk losing sight of the core principles that drive 
the enterprise of environmental law. Chief among those, this article argues, is the 
mission of minimizing adverse public health or ecological consequences from 
collective action.  
If addressing the consequences of collective action is the ultimate measure of 
successful environmental regulation, then judicial review frameworks ought to 
recognize cumulative impacts as an indispensable part of agency decisionmaking. 
Translated to legal terms, this means accepting a wider net, a longer leash, and a 
more mature perception on what are the attenuating benefits or harms of regulatory 
decisions. This means that when questions arise—like should cobenefits and 
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intergenerational harm be evaluated, or should upland development near streams be 
analyzed for their impairment of tribal treaty rights in downstream estuaries—there 
is an identifiable principle within regulatory decision making that recognizes the 
relevance of cumulative and long term impacts. It means that statutes containing 
regulatory thresholds keyed to public health risks should be understood to include 
cumulative risk from combined exposures as an indispensable part of 
decisionmaking. It means that coordinating TMDLS with discharge permits is not 
just an issue of best practices, but of nonarbitrary decisionmaking.  
In the end, whether one applauds infusing agency deference and statutory 
interpretation with a good dose of pragmatism could depend on individual views 
about the factors that courts find central to the decisionmaking process. The sensible 
check on that pragmatism, therefore, may be the very approach taken by this article: 
to identify other factors in addition to cost that ought to enjoy the status as centrally 
relevant, lest the judiciary adopt the power of bending environmental law too far 
away from the public health protections that lie at the heart of collective action 
problems they were meant to solve. 
